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ABSTRACT 
This thesis presents a general scheme for implementing Life Cycle Management 
(LCM) in the Bahrain Defense Force (BDF) and Bahrain Amiri Air Force (BAAF), with 
special attention paid to LCM issues for the F16 weapon system. The current situation of 
Bahrain, as well as the history and current challenges facing the BAAF in managing its 
Flo's, are presented. Those challenges are to reduce the Total Ownership Cost (TOC) of 
the F16 fleet to the bare minimum without disturbing the defensive posture of the BDF 
and BAAF. 
The related concepts of LCM, TOC, and Reduction in Total Ownership (R-TOC) 
are discussed in general, and also in the context of the BAAF F16 force. A feasible 
method of applying these methods to the BAAF's current situation is then presented in 
the form of recommended policies, procedures, roles, and responsibilities. Processes and 
procedures for use by both the BAAF and its suppliers in the management of resources 
are also recommended. These address all phases of the F16 life cycle (development, 
deployment, operation, maintenance, management, and retirement). 
The advantages associated with developing data and management systems for 
identification and tracking of the Total Ownership Cost (TOC) of the BAAF F-16 are 
likewise emphasized. They allow management to make effective trade-off decisions 
regarding the acceptance or rejection of modifications and upgrades. 
To demonstrate the method, an assessment of BAAF F16 Operations and Support 
(O&S) costs are also provided, with some of the data being generic and unclassified. 
Analysis of these data suggests significant cost savings to the BAAF are possible through 
changes in operational and support procedures, and specifically, through consolidation of 
support operations, elimination of some functions and consolidation of others. The 
implementation of these LCM procedures can be applied to other aircraft types in the 
BAAF, including the Flo's replacement 
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I.       INTRODUCTION 
A.       BACKGROUND 
In an era of rapidly changing technology, every military establishment and culture 
faces major problem. That problem is not what new weapon system should be bought, 
but how best to reduce the Total Operating Cost (TOC) of existing weapon systems. The 
difficult question that keeps decision makers and Life Cycle Management (LCM) on edge 
is in how to manage and maintain that current system during its operation life until 
disposal or retirement in such a way as to reduce its cost, i.e. to save money and time. 
Each country is faced with rising costs in maintenance. That cost must be attacked 
vigorously and continuously through LCM. Only with the reduction in TOC (RTOC), 
can any country start to budget for new weapon systems. Weapon systems must be 
reliable, maintained, available, and ready for any commitment counter to any threat and 
to deal with that threat at the right time, in the right place. 
The decision to field a new system requires a commitment to support that system 
throughout its life cycle. That life cycle is predicated on many things, such as how many 
flight hours per year per aircraft (in the case of the Bahrain Amiri Air Force (BAAF). 
Decisions to develop, procure, and support new systems are based on many factors, one. 
of which is the projected cost of the systems over their operational lifetime. 
When the state of Bahrain, represented by the Bahrain Defense Force (BDF), 
decided to procure a fighter aircraft, it went through several stages of investigation to 
evaluate various aircraft models. These models were the F-15, F-16, F-18 (all US), the 
British Tornado, the French Mirage 2000, and even a few Russian types. Maintainability, 
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reliability, supportability and the potential for future upgrade were the criteria that led the 
BDF to select the F-16, Block 40 Fighting Falcon. So, in 1990, the State of Bahrain 
became the fifteenth operator of the Fighting Falcon and the first air force in the Arabian 
Gulf region to adopt the F-16, thereby forging ahead at an astonishing pace. After the 
procurement of the F-16 Fighting Falcon by the BDF, the Bahraini Amiri Air Force 
(BAAF) has faced several critical requirements for it's support. 
This thesis focuses on and studies the problems that are facing the BAAF F-16 
Falcon program (Peace Crown I and II). These problems are Logistics, Upgrades and 
Technology, Training and finally Manpower. The intention is to give the reader an idea 
on how these criteria can play a major role in determining the readiness, maintainability, 
availability, and reliability thereby supporting the type of missions of the BAAF F-16 in 
wartime as well as in peace. A discussion regarding the effectiveness and impact on the 
policies of buying, not only new weapon systems, but also their influence in determining 
the source of supply regardless of the cost putting in consideration the time factor for 
procurement. 
The Total Ownership Cost (TOC), once referred to as the Life Cycle Cost (LCC) 
of a system, can be conveniently divided into several phases. (1) research and 
development, (2) production, (3) operating and support (O&S) and (4) the disposal. In 
this thesis, the preponderance of attention will be on the O&S phase. This is due to the 
fact that the F-16 weapon systems for the BAAF have already been procured. It will also 
identify a feasible approach and suggestions that can help in effectively managing the 
BAAF F-16 until disposal or retirement time. 
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The primary objective of this thesis is to formulate a general scheme suitable for 
managing the life cycle of the F-16 aircraft fleet for the Bahraini Amiri Air Force 
(BAAF) through the rest of its operational life. This scheme can also has the ability to 
manage, control and deal with the ongoing and the expected future circumstances of the 
Total Ownership Cost (TOC) of the Bahraini Amiri Air force (BAAF) F-16 aircraft and 
provide analytical tools that help reduce it. It must be approached in a wise way to save 
money and time to ensure the readiness, maintainability, reliability, supportability and 
availability of the aircraft for war and peace. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
• What is the current situation and national strategy of Bahrain? 
• What is the military capability that will be need by Bahrain in the future? 
• How does the current F-16 aircraft contribute to execution of military 
strategy? 
• What is the history of F-16 program in Bahrain? 
• What is the current literature about Life Cycle Management and its 
concept? 
• What are the three elements that comprise the Total Ownership Cost 
(TOC) and what sub-elements are included in each of the three major 
categories? 
• How well do various methods of Life Cycle Management fit other current 
circumstances of Bahraini F-16 aircraft? 
• What are the milestones and phases that accompany any acquisition 
program and what are the decisions affecting an acquisition? 
Define Total Ownership Cost (TOC) and what are the objectives of the 
TOC? 
What are the elements of TOC? 
What are the elements that make up the O&S cost? 
What does the cost model mean? What are the types of the cost models? 
What is the most useful model to manage the Bahraini F-16 aircraft Life 
Cycle? 
What is the first step use by the analysts in determining the TOC? 
What are cost drivers and how they are determined? 
What are the key decisions for managing Bahraini F-16 aircraft Life Cycle 
& when are these expecting them to occur? 
D.        RESEARCH SCOPE 
The scope will include: 
A review of a current situation of Bahraini F-16 aircraft & its mission 
An in-depth review of the Bahraini F-16 aircraft 
A review and evaluation of conceptual model of Bahraini F-16 Life Cycle 
Management 
A proposed model for managing Bahraini F-16 through the rest of their 
Life Cycle 
• Present a generic cost analysis of F-16 fleet TOC in a manner that BDF & 
BAAF can continue its LCM 
• Identify and analyze the cost drivers that constitute the biggest bear on the 
BDF budget and try to find the solutions that minimize their cost via 
implementing the LCM 
• The thesis will conclude with a recommendation: a general planning guide 
for managing the Bahraini F-16 aircraft 
E.   METHODOLOGY 
The methodology defines the activities that are needed to build a system, the 
Interfaces among those activities, and the products created as a result of those activities. 
The methodology used in this thesis research will consist of the following steps: 
• Conduct a literature search of books, magazine articles. CD-ROM 
systems, and other library information resources 
• Conduct a thorough review of the current situation of Bahrain as a nation 
in the world and in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
Conduct a thorough review of the history of Bahrain Defense Force (BDF) 
Conduct a thorough review of BAAF history and its establishment 
Conduct a thorough review of the F-16 program history in Bahrain 
Conduct a thorough review of the current literature about life cycle 
management and its concept 
• Analyze the various methods of life cycle management that fit the current 
circumstances of Bahraini F-16s 
• Identify the TOC elements and what each element includes 
• Conduct a thorough review of the TOC development process 
• Explore the other alternatives for the repair cycle process in terms of 
costing 
• Identify total ownership cost models for BAAF F-l 6 aircraft 
• Identify and analyze the cost drivers that create the greatest cost during the 
O&S cost and find solutions that may reduce or save assets 
• Determine the future development of the BAAF 
F.        ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
Chapter II, BAAF History and Present Situation. This chapter organize as 
follows: (1) Introduction to Bahrain as a country, (2) The stages and developments of 
establishing the BAAF, (3) Process of Acquiring the F-l 6. 
Chapter III, Life Cycle Management, describes life cycle management as follows: 
(1) Definition, (2) Purpose (3), Overview (4), Process of acquisition, (5) Milestones and 
phases in the acquisition life cycle, (6) Decisions affecting an acquisition and (7) 
Chapter Summary. 
Chapter IV focusing on the Total Ownership. This chapter starts as follows: 
(l)Definition, (2) Objective, (3) Description of TOC elements, (4) Methodology, (5) Cost 
models and (6) chapter Summary. 
6 
Chapter V addresses the BAAF F-16 Total Ownership Cost. This chapter organize 
as follows: (1) Description of ground rules and assumptions, (2) Procurements, (3) 
Operation & Support, (4) Disposal and (5) TOC Summary. 
Chapter VI focusing the BAAF O&S cost drivers. The chapter starts with (1) a 
brief description of cost drivers, (2) Identification of cost drivers, and (3) Discussion. 
Chapter VII, addresses: (1) Conclusion of the thesis and (2) Recommendation. 
7 
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II.     BAAF HISTORY AND PRESENT SITUATION 
(The defense of the country is the defense of all that we have inherited in 
terms of values, traditions and our plentiful land as well as our system of 
faith in God and respect for the individual). 
... H.H. Shaikh Hamad Bin Isa Al Khalifa, the Amir, the Supreme 
command 
A.       INTRODUCTION TO BAHRAIN 
The Arab Gulf abounds in islands. Important among them are the islands of 
Bahrain. Bahrain is made up of an archipelago consisting of a total of over 33 islands 
forming a rough triangle. To its west and north-west lies the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, to 
the north the Arab Gulf and to the east and south the state of Qatar. The total area of its 
territory is 687 square kilometers. Its population is approximately 53L000.1 
BAHBAIftl       Bandar öC. 
-   - L.<&nc|eii 
Doha 
C^JSSGD 
*—J »—*^* J' 
Figure 1. The Arab Gulf 
1
 Al Khalifa H, First Light: Modem Bahrain and its Heritage. UK, Kegan Paul Internationa!. 
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Frequently called the Pearl of the Arabian Gulf, Bahrain has a history of more 
than 5,000 years of civilization2 from the mists of time to a vibrant present under a stable 
and prosperous government. 
Bahrain is one of the most densely populated island countries in the world. 
Approximately 140,000 people3 reside in the capital city of Manama. Arabic is the 
official language, but many citizens also speak English. Bahrain is sometimes referred to 
as the Switzerland of the Middle East, because of its many banks and financial centers. 
The country has one of the lowest elevations in the world. Its highest point reaches a 
mere 134m or 440'. Bahrain's main exports are aluminum and petroleum. 
While Bahrain is relatively small in land area, population and resources, it has 
achieved a high level of social and economic development in a short period. The road 
network, international airport, telecommunications, public services, medical facilities and 
university are all recognized as being among the best in the world. 
B.        STAGES AND DEVELOPMENTS OF ESTABLISHING THE BAAF 
1. Background 
In September 1968, H.H Shaikh Isa Bin Salman Al Khalifa, the late Amir and the 
Supreme Commander established a defence organisation which was known at that time as 
the National Guard. H.H the Amir appointed H.E Shaikh Hamad Bin Isa Al Khalifa as 
Commander of the National Guard. The name was later changed by an Amiri decree to 
Bahrain Defence Force (BDF). The formation of the BDF was called by H.H Shaikh Isa 
Bin Salman Al Khalifa, the Amir as a result of the vacuum, which was expected after the 






stability, and also to co-operate with its neighbour states in protecting the region against 
dangers and threats. BDF goals are4: (1) Protect the country's security and sovereignty 
and fight against any enemy forces. (2) Support internal security and provide assistance 
whenever called. (3) Join GCC cooperation. However, in an interview published by the 
Lebanese paper "Al Anwaar" His Highness Shaikh Hamad said: 
(The most important role which our Defense Force would be called upon 
to play will be the "civilization role" ... I believe that when an army is 
built up on sound scientific principles it becomes a factor of stability)5. 
The stages of establishment and building the Bahraini Air Force were not easy. It 
encountered many challenges and difficult circumstances before it reached a good 
reputation in the international community. The processes and the stages of these 
developments are as follows: 
2. The Air Wing 
The foundation of the Bahrain Amiri Air Force (BAAF) came by order of H.H. 
Shaikh Hamad Bin Isa Al-khalifa the beloved Amir and Supreme Commander with the 
formation of an Air Wing on the 8th of May 1976 to complement other formations and 
units already in service in the B.D.F. The formation of BAAF was preceded by several 
studies conducted of the requirements of the Bahrain Defense Force, as dictated by 
geographical location, the strategic position of the country and the standards achieved by 
advanced countries in this field. 
In view of the strategic requirements the national authorities initially adopted a 
project for equipping the air wing with helicopters. The reasons behind that were6: 
4
 Major A. A. R. MALALLAH AL SABT, Model for Purchasing and Inventory for Bahrain Defense 
Force, Unpublished Masters Dissertation, Royal Military College of Science, July. 1998. 
5
 Leader and the Force. http://www.bahrain.gov.bh/English/books/Leader and Force/index.asp 
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• 
Potential and capacity for rapid movement 
Combat reconnaissance and rescue under various conditions 
Capability of challenging hostile Armour 
Great maneuverability and low-level flying capability, which kept it away 
from detection 
The tasks assigned to the air arm were numerous and important: (1) supporting 
the ground forces by quickly transferring equipment whose movement over ground in 
high mountains or water surfaces or sand stretches is difficult, (2) defense of the air space 
and boundaries of the country on land, (3) defense of territorial waters in conjunction 
with the Navy. 
On 26 October 1974, the BDF sent the first batch of pilots to the King Faisal Air 
Academy in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to study aerospace sciences. To prepare the 
necessary personnel to fulfil all the needed technical, engineering and maintenance 
functions, the first two groups of NCO's were sent to the United Kingdom in 1974 and 
1975 for basic training. Once all the essential preliminary preparations had been 
completed, the first helicopters for the BAAF arrived in Bahrain on 25 February 1977. 
On the 5th of February 1980, which coincided with the 12th anniversary of the 
formation of BDF, the late Amir H.H. Shaikh Isa Bin Salman Al-Khalifa honoured the 
BAAF when it received its banner from the benevolent hands of His Highness during the 
ceremony and parade which were held on the runway of Al-sakhir airfield. 
6
 http://www.bahrain.gov.bh/English/books/Leader and Force/chap03 01 .asp 
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At the beginning of May 1979, construction of Al-Riffa Air Base started and on 
the 4   of September 1979 the operational helicopter squadron arrived at the new base. 
On the 26th of April 1982, the late H.H. Shaikh Isa Bin Salman Al-Khalifa 
officially opened the Al-Riffa base which was a landmark event in his reign and one that 
marked his gracious and bountiful leadership. 
3. Air Force 
Sheik Isa Air Base is home to the BAAF and is located on the shores of the 
Arabian Gulf in southern Bahrain. It hosts the BAAF Fighter Wing and the two 
squadrons that comprise it. The 1st Fighter Squadron operates twelve Block 40 F-16s 
alongside twelve F-5E/F Tiger IIs from the 6th Fighter Squadron. (Any visitor to this 
spacious, modern air base may not believe" that Bahrain's air power capability less than 
fifteen years ago consisted exclusively of rotary aircraft.)7. 
In 1985 the Bahraini Air Force entered the road to high-performance fighters, and 
then immediately maneuvered to the fast lane. This entrance made a big jump in the field 
of improving Bahrain's arms and weapons by purchasing through US FMS 12 Northrop 
F-5 E/F combat aircraft. With the acceptance of the F-5 aircraft in October 1985, the 
BAAF joined the jet age. 
On 12 December 1985, His Highness Shaikh Hamad Bin Isa Al-Khalifa the 
beloved Amir and Supreme commander announced the arrival of a number of new F-5 
fighter aircraft; marking a turning point in the history of the BAAF. The procurement of 
the F-5 aircraft supported the security of the country and modernised its air fleet in order 




In March 1987, Bahrain ordered twelve F-16 aircraft through the U.S. FMS, and 
through a program which became known as Peace Crown. In 1990, the BAAF become 
the fifteenth operator of the Fighting Falcon and the first air force in the Arabian Gulf 
region to adopt the F-16. The BAAF had forged ahead at an astonishing pace8. 
On the 28th of May 1990, H.H Shaikh Hamad Bin Isa Al-Khalifa, the beloved 
Amir and Supreme Commander, paid an inspection visit to the BAAF on the occasion of 
the introduction of the F-16 fighter planes, in order to follow up the first construction 
phase at the Shaikh Isa Air Force. Under the patronage of H.H Shaikh Isa Bin Salman Al- 
Khalifa the inauguration ceremony of the Shaikh Isa Air Base, one of the most modern 
installations designed to accommodate new aircraft, took place on the 2nd of February 
19939. 
On June 22, 2000 Bahrain received the first of its new production F-16 aircraft 
today in ceremonies at Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company. The aircraft is the first of 
10 F-16s purchased under the Peace Crown II program. Col. Khalifa Al-Khalifa, Defense 
Attache for the Embassy of Bahrain, accepted the first of the F-16s that will establish a 
new fighter squadron for the Bahrain Amiri Air Force (BAAF) at Sheikh Isa Air Base. 
The new F-16s will supplement the BAAF's existing inventory of 12 Block 40s (eight C 
model, four D model) that were purchased in 1987 and delivered in 1990. 
8
 Code One Magazine Archives, October 1999, Volume 14 No. 4. 
9
 Implementations of B.D.F in the era of H.H Shaikh Hamad Bin Isa Al-Khalifa the Amir and supreme 
commander. 
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Bahrain has shown remarkable proficiency with the F-16, flying 167 combat 
sorties during Desert Storm only months after the introduction and delivery of the first F- 
16 to their air force10. 
Since its foundations, the BAAF has witnessed further efforts to develop and 
modernize in the field of fighter jets and all types of equipment and supplies such as the 
Black Hawk and Cobra Helicopters. 
C.       PROCESS OF ACQUIRING THE F-16 
1.        Peace Crown I 
In March of 1987, the government of the Arabian Gulf nation of Bahrain signed a 
letter of agreement for 12 F-16C/D fighter aircraft (8 Charlies and 4 Deltas) under the 
Peace Crown Foreign Military Sales program. The first aircraft were accepted in March 
1990. and arrived in Bahrain on the 23rd of May 1990 as shown in Figure 2. 




Since the F-16s for Bahrain were acquired under the Foreign Military Sales 
program, they were assigned USAF serial numbers. However, the aircraft only carry 
indigenous serial numbers. The aircraft numbers and air force legends on the fuselage 
sides appear in both English and Arabic1'. 
2. Peace Crown II 
In the early stages of what would ultimately result in Peace Crown II, Bahrain 
briefly negotiated with the US Navy about the purchase of 18 Ex-US Navy F-16s. The F- 
16Ns, withdrawn from US Navy aggressor training roles in 1994, would be exchanged 
for 8 F-5Es and 4 F-5Fs operated by Bahrain since 1985. The F-16Ns would supplement 
the 12 F-16C/Ds already in service, while the US Navy planned to use the Ex-Bahraini F- 
5s for the aggressor roles instead of the- F-16s. This option was abandoned due to 
concerns about Bahrain's ability to support a non-standard air aircraft. Two alternative 
options were then proposed; either acquisition of ten new aircraft or the purchase of 20 
upgraded aircraft. In either case the aircraft would be fitted with the avionics being 
installed in F-16s under the F-16 Mid Life Update (MLU) program. 
Ultimately, the decision was taken to order 10 new F-16C Block 40 aircraft. The 
decision to buy new aircraft was apparently due to the commonality with Bahrain's other 
12 Block 40s, lower overall cost, and longer service life12. 
The new production F-16 aircraft is basically the same Block 40 configuration as 
the aircraft from Peace Crown I, with some new equipment items added. These include a 
color cockpit TV system, APG-68 (V) 8 radar, and AIM-120 advanced medium range 
11
 http://www.f-16.net/reference/users/fl 6 bh.html 
12
 http://www.f-16.net/reference/users/fl6 bh.html 
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air-to-air missile (AMRAAM) capability. All of the new aircraft will be single seat F- 
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III.    LIFE CYCLE MANAGEMENT 
A. DEFINITION 
Life Cycle Management (LCM) is the structure used to insure proper decision 
processes are in place and utilized that influence the system performance, cost and 
usefulness. These processes must be based on full consideration of military operational 
requirements, economic affordability, and technical feasibility in order to obtain and 
maintain an effective weapon system. 
B. PURPOSE 
This study will establish the processes including policies, procedures, roles, and 
responsibilities governing the development, deployment, operation, maintenance, 
management, and retirement of BAAF F-16 aircraft within the Bahrain Defense Force 
(BDF). It is essential the BDF and BAAF understand the United States Air Force ('USAF) 
LCM process because it applies to the development of the total weapon system and. 
equally important, to the modifications/upgrades that occur to the weapon system. In any 
LCM process regardless of the country, the manufacturing country , and in the case of the 
BAAF F-16, the United States, the country acquiring the weapon system or any 
modifications/upgrades must fully understand how the system or parts have been 
developed and managed. This then allows the BDF and BAAF to insure that what they 
are receiving is the best possible product. If there is no, or poor, LCM processes being 
used by the manufacturing country; it can only be assumed that the product will not be 
the best quality for the price paid. 
C. OVERVIEW 
1.        Objective 
The objectives of LCM are to: 
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• 
Deliver quality weapon systems which meet or exceed the Bahrain 
Defense Force (BDF) and the Bahraini Amiri Air Force (BAAF) 
expectations when promised and within cost estimates, from the system 
developer, through the acquiring organization to the BDF, and to the 
flying operation within the BAAF 
Deliver weapon systems that work effectively and efficiently within the 
current and planned information technology infrastructure within the BDF 
and the BAAF 
Deliver weapon systems that are affordable, maximize the ability to 
maintain, and are cost-effective to enhance for the life of the system 
Develop quality systems using an identifiable, measurable, and repeatable 
process. These systems apply to all areas of decision processes within the 
BDF and the BAAF. 
Establish an organizational and project management structure with 
appropriate levels of authority to ensure each system project is effectively 
managed throughout its life cycle and for the life cycle or the BAAF F-16 
program. 
Identify and assign the roles and responsibilities of all affected parties 
including functional and technical managers throughout the system life 
cycle. This will include the relationships with the system developer, the 
acquiring offices, the offices responsible for supporting the fleet, and the 




Ensure that system requirements are well defined and subsequently 
satisfied at all times during the life cycle. These requirements can be 
expected to change with time as the system ages and the threat of potential 
aggressor fleets of aircraft change their equipment or tactics. 
Provide visibility to functional and technical managers for all systems 
resource requirements and expenditures 
Establish appropriate levels of management authority to provide timely 
direction, coordination, control, review, and approval of the system and 
the changes to the project throughout the life cycle 
Ensure project management accountability at all levels for the total life 
cycle of the fleet of BAAF F-16 aircraft 
• Identify project risks early and manage them before they become problems 
during the initial acquisition of the system, and for all future proposed 
changes to the system 
2. Function 
Life Cycle Management (LCM) provides the mechanism necessary to develop 
data and management systems necessary to provide the best possible weapon system.14 
The result of good LCM is the ability to identify, track, and manage the Total Ownership 
Cost (TOC). Business practices associated with LCM increase the flexibility of both the 
BAAF and providers to handle their funds and resources. It provides the BDF and the 
BAAF an accurate picture of management results early enough to allow for corrections. 
14
 Navy Information System Management Center (NISMC) Life Cycle Management (LCM) Review 
Handbook; April 1994, Section 1.0 Introduction. 
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Included in the LCM is the management of the TOC, including the true costs of support 
requirements. This allows them to make effective trade-off decisions on the level of 
support service needed for operations.15 It establishes the processes and procedures to 
track the resources used or consumed to satisfy the BAAF requirements. 
LCM can best be described by the management of the changes due to warfighter 
needs when compared to the present fighter system. If the warfighter needs are to be met 
and the present system does not fulfill the need, then some type of modification, upgrade, 
or new aircraft system needs to be put in place. 
This is pictorially presented by Figure 3 below. 
Within the BAAF, there are 22 Fl 6 fighter aircraft. These aircraft were acquired 
in two separate purchases. This has required the BDF and BAAF-to employ LCM, and 
monitor TOC. The TOC concept for the BAAF emphasizes two of the major elements: 
Procurement and Operations and Support (O&S). In the arena of major upgrades, the 
BAAF must involve itself in the RDT&E of the upgrade as well. For example, should 
there be a need to upgrade the radar system, it is likely the new radar would require some 
RDT&E. This cost could, and probably would, be shared by several countries. Therefore, 
the BDF and the BAAF would be involved in all aspects of the life cycle and its LCM. 
This involvement includes all aspects of the problems faced by any country, the 
balancing of the precious assets of the country as well as its needs. 
Figure 4 provides a visual representation of those needs. 
15
 Dr. Gansler, Memo, Definition of Total Ownership Cost (TOC), Life Cycle Cost (LCC), and the 
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Figure 3. Process Decision for Life Cycle Management (LCM). 
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Figure 4. Issues Faced by any MOD. 
Failure to perform proper LCM could, and probably would, result in failure(s) to 
achieve the best possible solution to the needs of the BAAF. It could also result in an 
O&S cost that would be higher. This higher cost would affect both the MOD and the 
BAAF by consuming precious currency that could be better used elsewhere. 
Utilizing the management techniques defined by LCM, Reduction of the Total 
Ownership Cost (R-TOC) becomes a continuous effort. This effort is employed by all to 
maximize LCM in truly reducing the TOC. This continuous effort minimizes the TOC of 
the weapon system, thereby freeing up funds for other needs. Without an effective LCM, 
R-TOC would not be possible.16 
In order to reduce the TOC costs, it is essential to know the make-up of the TOC. 
There are three distinct elements that comprise TOC. These elements are: Development 
(sometimes referred to Research, Development Test and Evaluation (RDT&E)), 
Procurement, and Operations and Support (O&S). Development and Procurement 
combined are defined as the Program Acquisition. It is also important to understand what 
sub-elements are included in each of the three major categories.17 
Figure 5 provides the decomposition of the three major elements into each of the 
various sub-elements. The Flyaway and additional sub-elements combine to become the 
Weapon System. It, combined with other additional sub-elements, becomes the 
Procurement. This continues until all the sub-elements are accounted for and represents 
the Total Ownership. 
16
 Department of Defense, DoDD 5000.1; The Defense Acquisition System; 23 October 2000. 
Paragraph 4.4.1 Total System Approach. 
17
 Department of Defense Deskbook, 31 January 2001, Open Systems Strategy (dated Aug 2000). 
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Figure 5. Elements of TOC. 
In order to appreciate the value of LCM, it is essential each manager understand 
the relative values of each of the TOC elements. Relative values are expressed in many 
different ways, but it is essential to first understand what value is. Basically, value can be 
expressed as the difference between the benefits (sometimes found out by doing a cost 
benefit analysis (CBA)) and the costs of the purchase or upgrade.18 It is expressed as a 
formula in Figure 6. 
18
 AF Manual 65-506; Economic Analysis: 1 July 1995, paragraph 1.2.1. 
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VALUE = BENEFITS - COSTS 
Figure 6. Definition of Value. 
Figure 7 provides a visual depiction of the breakdown of the costs associated with 
TOC. 
Total cost visibility prompts the provider and customer to find more efficient 
methods of accomplishing their respective missions. This makes customer support more 
efficient and responsive as providers trim production resources and customers cut 
extraneous/high-value requirements. 
D.        PROCESS 
1. Acquisition 
Considering  military weapons systems acquisition,  the United  States  (US) 
Department of Defense (DoD) continually attempts to improve military capability while 
striving to reduce the high cost of acquiring this capability, producing an efficient 
acquisition process. 
• The defense acquisition system is a single uniform system \vhercb> all 
equipment, facilities, and services are planned, developed, acquired, 
maintained, and disposed of within US DoD. The system includes policies 
and practices, which govern identifying and prioritizing resource 
requirements, acquisition, contracting, and reporting to the US Congress. 
A successful weapon system acquisition program is one which places a 
capable and supported weapon, commodity, etc. in the hands of a user 
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Figure 7.        Elements of the TOC. 
• The DoD acquisition system includes all facets of acquisition, from new 
acquisition programs through modification and upgrade of existing 
systems. The acquisition system's goal is to provide quality products and 
services at an affordable Total Ownership Cost (TOC) and in a timely 
manner. The acquisition process begins with the identification of broadly 
stated mission needs, which cannot be met by non-materiel solutions. The 
process may continue through one or more of the five acquisition 
phases.19 
Figure 8 below provides a visual representation of the elements of the US 
government involved in the LCM of a weapon system. 
19





Figure 8. Agencies Involved in LCM. 
2. Cost As an Independent Variable (CAJV) 
There is a process described as Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV) utilized 
within the LCM.  This process is used in the negotiation of the requirements necessary 
for the development process to produce an affordable product as shown by Figure 9 
below. 
The CAIV process requires engineering and management review to provide the 
best value for the most affordable price. In order to do this, each trade study must be 
evaluated in the total scheme of the LCM20. The result of this evaluation produces the 
necessary information for an informed LCM thereby producing what is called the "CAIV 
Curve" which is shown below in Figure 10. 
2Q Department of Defense Deskbook, 31 Januars' 2001, Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV), last 
reviewed Sep 1999. 
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Figure 9.        Affordability Issues. 
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•Separate features inro additions 
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•Calculate slope for each feature. 
•Plot additions, end-to-end, up from 
baseline in order of decreasing slope. 
•Plot deletions, end-to-end, down from 
baseline in order of increasing slope. 
Figure 10.       CAIV Curve. 
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Figure 11.       CAIV Interface within the LCM. 
Continuing the discussion regarding CAIV, engineering efforts and the LCM 
combine to produce the best value at the most affordable price. Figure 11 identifies some 
of the process. 
E.        MILESTONES AND PHASES IN THE ACQUISITION LIFE CYCLE 
1.        Background 
Defense systems normally take 12-15 years from deficiency identification to 
system fielding. For purposes of control, an acquisition program is broken down into 
milestones and phases. A milestone is a decision point scheduled in the Acquisition 
Strategy. A milestone defines that point in time when a program completes one phase and 
is ready to move into another phase. The US DoD has five such milestones scheduled at 
specific points in a program's life cycle. In order to move from one milestone to the next, 
the program is reviewed and approved by the appropriate level of review within the DoD. 
The five milestones, designated as Milestone 0 through Milestone IV, are used to manage 
major defense acquisition programs. Acquisition phases are tailored to meet each 
30 
acquisition's needs and to minimize acquisition time and TOC. These five phases are 
designed to be consistent with the urgency of need and degree of technical risk involved 
with the program.21 The acquisition life cycle phases illustrated in Figure 12, beginning 
with Milestone 0, Concept Studies approval, depicts the: 
• system acquisition phases 
• nominal length of time required for each phase 
• purpose of each related milestones or decision points, 
• major documentation required, 
• contracting activities associated with each phase 
immmmml 
• OFiflSSiOi I 
















Figure 12.       Milestone Decisions Associated with Acquisition Phases. 
-' DoDI 5000.2; Operation of the Defense Acquisition System; (Including Change 1); 4 January 2001 
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Figure 13 below provides identification of the risk reduction process used in 
LCM. This risk is all the risks associated with the program including program risk, 
schedule risk, cost risk, etc. as established in the risk management process. 
2.        2.0 Milestones 
• Milestone 0, Concept Studies Approval.   The decision authority must 
determine if a validated mission need warrants the initiation of a study of 
alternative concepts. This milestone marks the initial interface between 
the requirements generation process and the acquisition management 
system. A favorable decision authorizes a minimum set of alternative 
concepts to be studied.22 
* Phase 0, Concept Exploration and Definition. The purpose of this 
phase is to explore materiel alternatives that could satisfy a 
documented mission need. Cost and operational effectiveness 
analyses (COEA) are prepared for review at Milestone I. A 
proposed- acquisition strategy is developed for the most promising 
system concept(s), and initial cost, schedule, and performance 
objectives are established. 
22
 DoDI 5000.2; Operation of the Defense Acquisition System; (Including Change 1); 4 January 2001, 
paragraph 4.5.3. 
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Figure 13.       Risk Reduction Process within LCM. 
Milestone I, Concept Demonstration Approval.  At this milestone, the 
decision authority assesses the results of Phase 0 and evaluates the 
affordability of a proposed new program. A favorable decision establishes 
a new acquisition program, which is authorized to enter Phase I. A 
"concept baseline" identifying initial cost, schedule, and performance 
objectives is established.23 
• Phase I, Demonstration and Validation.    The objective of this 
phase is to ensure that critical technologies and design approaches 
are understood and are attainable. Cost, schedule, and 
performance trade-offs are made within affordability and design- 
to-cost constraints. A "development baseline" is proposed, and the 
23




analyses and information needed to support a Milestone II decision 
are developed. 
Milestone II, Development Approval. The purpose of this review is to 
determine if the results of Phase I warrant a program's continuation. The 
decision authority must assess the program's affordability and establish a 
development baseline containing refined cost, schedule, and performance 
objectives.24 
• Phase II, Engineering and Manufacturing Development. The objective 
of this phase is to translate the preferred design approach developed in 
Phase I into a stable system. Configuration controls are established, and 
demonstration testing is conducted. The acquisition strategy, system 
performance requirements, and system cost estimates are refined. 
Resources are committed commensurate with the control and reduction of 
risk. 
• Milestone III, Production Approval. The purpose of this review is to 
determine whether the results of Phase II warrant continuation of a 
program. The decision authority must assess the program's affordability, 
ensure that the system design is stable and producible, and establish a 
"production baseline" containing refined cost, schedule, and performance 
objectives.25 
24
 DoDD 5000.1, Para D.3.e and DoD 5000.2-R, Part 1.2, last reviewed Aug 1999. 
25
 DoDD 5000.1, Para D.3.e and DoD 5000.2-R, Part 1.2, last reviewed Aug 1999. 
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• Phase III, Production and Deployment. The objective of this phase 
is to establish a stable, efficient production and support base. The 
ability of the system to satisfy the validated mission need is 
assessed. Performance and quality are monitored in follow-on 
operational support and testing. Needs for major upgrades or 
modifications requiring Milestone IV approval are identified. 
Milestone IV, Major Modification Approval. This review is conducted 
"as required" to determine if new procurement or major upgrades to a 
system currently in production are warranted. The need for a new system 
or major modifications may arise from a change in the threat or a revision 
in the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), from a deficiency identified 
during Phase III testing, or from an opportunity to reduce the TOC. Prior 
to committing to a major modification, the decision authority may ask for 
a review of other alternatives, thus reentering the process at Phase 0.26 
• Phase IV, Operations and Support. This phase overlaps with Phase 
III, Production and Deployment. The declaration of an initial 
operational capability or the transfer of management responsibility 
from the developer to the maintainer marks this phase. Fielded 
systems are monitored until the time of their disposal in order to 
assess their capabilities and the effects of aging. Where 
appropriate, modifications are undertaken to extend service life. 
26
 DoDD 5000.4; Cost Analysis Improvement Group(CAIG); (Includes Change 1); November 16, 
1994. 
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As noted earlier, total ownership costs are considered at each decision milestone 
in the acquisition process. Although the portion of TOC defined as the Operations and 
Support (O&S) costs are not actually incurred until after a system is deployed, the major 
decisions that ultimately determine O&S costs are made long before a system is fielded. 
Beginning with Milestone I, the DoD Cost Advisory Improvement Group (CAIG) must 
review the program office and independent cost estimates prepared by the sponsoring 
DoD component to ensure that an independent projection of system costs is available to 
the relevant Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) committee and to the DAB. Total 
Ownership cost estimates figure heavily into the evaluation of system alternatives. To 
compare alternatives over the long term, O&S costs must be estimated and evaluated, 
particularly in those areas subject to possible change or uncertainty. Since the O&S cost 
of a weapon system can exceed both the development and production costs, a thorough 
analysis of O&S costs is required at each acquisition milestone. For each milestone 
review by the DAB, the CAIG prepares a report summarizing its evaluation of the cost 
projections submitted by the program office and by an independent cost-estimating team. 
The CAIG provides any additional estimates that may be required to remedy deficiencies 
in the cost estimates under review and, if serious problems are found, it may suggest that 
the DAB committee defer its meeting on the program. 
F.        DECISIONS AFFECTING AN ACQUISITION 
There are three major decision-making support systems affecting acquisition. 
These   support   systems   are   the   Requirements   Generation   System,   Acquisition 
Management System, and the planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS).27 
27
 DoDI 5000.2; Operation of the Defense Acquisition System; (Including Change 1); 4 January 2001, 
paragraph 4.6.1.3. 
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All three systems must work together to achieve program success, and the financial 
manager will have responsibilities and reporting requirements for each of these systems. 





Figure 14.       Decision-Making Support Systems. 
1.        The Requirements Generation System. 
Produces information for decision makers on proposed mission needs. These 
needs are initially expressed in broad operational terms and progressively translated into 
system-specific   performance   requirements.    The   first   interaction   between   the 
Requirements Generation System and the Acquisition Management System occurs at 
Milestone I. The Requirements Generation System involves: 
• Identifying and processing mission needs  resulting from  continuing 
assessments of current and projected capabilities in the context of 
changing military threats and national defense policy. 
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• Developing and processing Mission Needs Statements (MNS) which 
document projected needs in broad operational (not system specific) 
terms. MNSs are initially forwarded to the Joint Requirements 
Operational Committee (JROC) for validation and approval. Approved 
MNSs are then forwarded to the DAB; disapproved MNSs are returned to 
the originating agency.28 
2. The Acquisition Management System 
Provides a streamlined acquisition management structure and an event-driven 
acquisition process which links milestone decision points to demonstrated 
accomplishments. This process provides the basis for making informed trade-off 
decisions, given affordability constraints and user needs. This is the means for 
translating user needs into alternative concepts, and finally a stable system design.29 
3. The Planning Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS)30 
PPBS provides the basis for- making informed affordability assessments and 
resource allocation decisions on defense acquisition programs. This system is time 
driven, while the Acquisition Management System is event driven. The PPBS strives to 
provide operating commanders the best mix of forces and support in view of fiscal 
constraints. The challenge for the program manager and financial manager is avoiding a 
mismatch between program requirements and available funding. The PPBS is managed 
by the Deputy Secretary of Defense with assistance from the Defense Program Review 
28
 DoDI 5000.2; Operation of the Defense Acquisition System; (Including Change 1); 4 Januar. 2001, 
paragraph 4.6.1.1. 
29
 DoDI 5000.2; Operation of the Defense Acquisition System; (Including Change 1); 4 January 2001, 
paragraph 4.6.1.2. 
30
 DoDI 5000.2; Operation of the Defense Acquisition System; (Including Change 1); 4 January 2001, 
paragraph 4.6.1.3. 
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Board (DPRB). Formal interface between the PPBS and Requirements Generation 
System occurs every two years when Military Departments (MILDEPs) and defense 
agencies submit their Program Objective Memoranda (POM) to the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD). This system is comprised of three phases — planning, 
programming, and budgeting. 
• The Planning Phase results in the development of a broad long-range 
investment plan for each DoD Component (with programming and 
budgeting responsibilities) in addition to the Defense Planning Guidance 
(outlines broad policy objectives and military strategy). 
• The Programming Phase results in the development of a six-year defense 
program, called the fiscal year defense program (FYDP)31, for each DoD 
Component and DoD as a whole. The FYDP links national policies, 
strategy, and objectives to specific forces and major programs, including 
acquisition programs. It is based on the Defense Planning Guidance and 
on updated out year fiscal projections. The FYDP proposals for each DoD 
component with programming responsibilities are documented in the POM 
submitted in April of every other (even numbered) calendar year. The 
Deputy Secretary of Defense determines which actions are to be taken on' 
each issue. These decisions are recorded and issued to each DoD 
Component in a Program Decision Memorandum (PDM). This PDM 
provides the basis for the financial plans developed during the budgeting 
phase. 
31
 DoDI 5000.2; Operation of the Defense Acquisition System; (Including Change 1); 4 January 2001, 
paragraph 4.7.3.2.1.3. 
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• The Budgeting Phase results in the development of the Secretary of 
Defense's recommendations to the President for the administration's 
biennial budget request for DoD. DoD budget proposals are forwarded to 
the DoD Comptroller in the Budget Estimate Submission (BES) submitted 
in September of every other calendar year.32 Budget hearings are 
conducted by representatives of the DoD Comptroller and focus on the 
execution status of specific programs, including programs reviewed by the 
DAB. Results of these hearings are documented in Program Budget 
Decisions. These documents provide alternatives to the budget estimates 
submitted by the DoD Components. Budget wrap-up meetings, held in 
December by the SECDEF and the DEPSECDEF, are used to raise and 
resolve major issues before the budget request is finalized. SECDEF 
decisions are then documented in DoD's biennial budget request, which is 
submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for inclusion 
in the President's budget request that is submitted to Congress in January. 
G.        SUMMARY 
Life Cycle Management (LCM) begins when there is a stated need that creates an 
approved requirement and ends when a weapon system is removed from service. This is 
commonly called "cradle to grave". Management is essential throughout the weapon 
system's entire life cycle. LCM begins when there is an approved requirement. It 
continues through the design phase, development phase, procurement phase, and the 
operations and support phase. During this time, the management of the cost of all aspects 
32
 DoDI 5000.2; Operation of the Defense Acquisition System; (Including Change 1); 4 January 2001, 
paragraph 4.7.3.2.1.3. 
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of the weapon system results in the most affordable Total Ownership Cost (TOC) 
possible. Failure to continuously manage the weapon system effectively will 
undoubtedly result in higher costs, unnecessary requirements, longer development cycle, 
and unfulfilled requirements. All of which result in a weapon system unacceptable to the 
country, the BDF, and the BAAF. 
41 
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IV.    TOTAL OWNERSHIP COST 
A. DEFINITION 
Total Ownership Cost (TOC) has been discussed briefly in earlier chapters in 
general terms. A more complete definition of TOC is: 
The sum of financial resources to organize, equip, sustain, and operate 
military forces to meet national goals, policies, and standards of readiness, 
environmental compliance, safety, and quality of life concerns. The TOC 
for Defense systems consists of the costs to research, develop, acquire, 
own, operate, and dispose of weapon and support systems. It includes 
direct costs and indirect costs attributable to the systems and infrastructure 
costs not directly attributable to the system. Product support mainly 
concerns the portion of TOC that occurs after the system is deployed (the 
sustainment and disposal phase of a system's life cycle).33 
B. OBJECTIVES 
The Bahrain Defense Force (BDF) must pay strict attention to any major 
acquisition. This is necessary to not only maintain the budget but to insure the country's 
defensive capability. The BDF needs to evaluate the stated requirements expressed by 
the defense agencies, such as the Bahraini Amiri Air Force (BAAF), but also to assure 
that the solution is affordable. As with any country's defense departments, there are 
conflicting requirements, and needs greater than budgets can accommodate. This is why 
the BDF must insure that Life Cycle Management (LCM) is well planned and strongly 
implemented. The Total Ownership Cost (TOC) for the weapon system must be known 
and managed throughout its life cycle. In the case of the BAAF F16 fighter aircraft, the 
TOC for planning purposes represents those costs that are not sunk. Many modifications, 
support procedures, warranties, guarantees, etc. involved with the support to the F16 
organization  within  the   BAAF   must   still   be   managed  using   LCM  techniques. 
33
 Department of Defense (DoD) 5000.2, paragraph E2.1.20. 
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Modifications, upgrades, and the support structure for the F16 organization will continue 
for some time and require aggressive management and support by all echelons. 
The objectives of TOC are to: 
• Support Life Cycle Management (LCM): Without insight into the TOC 
for the F16 organization, there cannot be any Reduction of Total 
Ownership Cost (RTOC). This could also cause unnecessary O&S costs 
incurred by aging aircraft that has not been managed properly due to lack 
of information and management attention. 
• Provide budgetary analyses: Coupled with the LCM of the F16 fleet and 
its organizational structure, is the requirement to pay the support costs. 
This would include acquisition of modifications and upgrades that may, or 
may not, cause a RTOC. Sometimes, operational requirements dictate an 
increase in Ö&S costs, which must be managed aggressively to minimize 
that increase. 
• Maintain visibility into any acquisition or modification of a weapon 
system. Through technical representatives from the various suppliers and 
exchanges of information between them, what is being developed for 
modifications and upgrades can be known. Through this knowledge, the 
BDF and the BAAF can better determine if this modification/upgrade is 
necessary for Bahrain. 
• Support internal cost controls. The BDF has a responsibility to maintain 
expenditures within its budget. In order to accomplish this, it must have a 
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clear understanding of the effects of the TOC for the F16 organization. It 
is incumbent upon the entire F16 structure to know and manage TOC with 
constant efforts to reduce that cost (RTOC). 
Insure affordability 
• The affordability determination is made while addressing cost 
during the requirements definition process, beginning with the 
acquisition cost but1 using TOC where available and validated.34 
Approval of the TOC estimate is reviewed during each budget 
cycle with updates in between. Should the TOC exceed the 
budgeted amount for the F16 organization, immediate actions must 
be taken to eliminate the budget overrun. These actions could be 
in the form of reduced flying hours or more drastic measures such 
as not flying some percentage of the. aircraft. This is a decision 
that must be made by the decision-makers using LCM. TOC must 
support the LCM and therefore maintain the Flo's affordability. 
• Many times there are alternatives identified in the requirements 
definition phase of any acquisition. Analysis of Alternatives 
(AOA) is part of the Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV) 
process.35 Cost must be viewed as an independent variable, and the 
BDF and the BAAF need to plan programs based on realistic 
projections of funding likely to be available in future years. To the 
34
 Department of Defense (DoD) 5000.2, paragraph 4.7.3.2.2.4. 
35
 Department of Defense (DoD) 5000.3-R3, paragraph 4.2. — Analysis of Alternatives (AoA). 
45 
• 
greatest extent possible, they should identify the TOC, and, at a 
minimum, the major drivers of TOC.36 It is essential to the TOC 
process that each alternative be examined, includings all elements 
of the TOC from design to disposal. This includes the associated 
Line Replaceable Units (LRU). The analysis should consider the 
benefits and detriments, of accelerated and delayed introduction of 
military capabilities, including the effect on TOC. 
As part of the acquisition strategy, program managers should develop and 
document a support strategy for life-cycle sustainment and continuous 
improvement of product affordability, reliability, and supportability, while 
sustaining readiness. This effort should ensure that system support and 
life-cycle affordability considerations are addressed and documented as an 
integral part of the program's overall acquisition strategy. The support 
strategy should define the supportability planning, analyses, and trade-offs 
conducted to determine the optimum support concept for a materiel 
system, and strategies for continuous affordability improvement 
throughout the product life cycle. The support strategy should continue to 
evolve toward greater detail as the program matures. It contains sufficient' 
detail to define how the program will address the support and fielding 
requirements that meet readiness and performance objectives, lower TOC, 
reduce risks, and avoid harm to the environment and human health.37 
36
 Department of Defense (DoDD) 5000.1, paragraph 4.5.2. - Cost and Affordability. 
37
 Department of Defense (DoD) 5000.2-R1, paragraph 2.8. ~ Support Strategy. 
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C.       ELEMENTS OF TOC 
Figure 5 above identified the elements of TOC in definitional terms only.   In 
order to fully understand the impact of TOC, a more complete understanding of each 
element of TOC must be insured. These elements are acquisition and operations and 
support (O&S). 
• The program acquisition is composed of two major elements,  (1). 
Research and development (R&D) and (2) Procurement. 
• Both the BDF and the BAAF in any acquisition determination 
must consider R&D. This is true in the total weapon system 
acquisition as well as in any new modification to the aircraft. Even 
though the F-16 fighter aircraft has already been purchased by the 
BAAF and has been in the BAAF inventory for a period of years, 
modifications are continually being developed and installed in the 
worldwide fleet of F 16s. These modifications require some form 
of R&D. The R&D of a new fighter or a modification could cost 
10-15% of the TOC. The BDF and the BAAF must monitor these 
modifications and determine if they fit the profile and requirements 
of the BDF, the BAAF, and are affordable. For example, suppose 
a new radar system is under development. That development cost 
and its associated procurement cost is normally quite high for the 
first few radar systems procured. The BDF and the BAAF must 
determine if it is a pressing current requirement and affordable, or 
should they wait and procure the item when it is less costly? 
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• Procurement of newer F16 aircraft or modifications to the existing fleet 
causes focused TOC analyses. Not only is there the concern regarding 
R&D cost, but also the cost of the procurement of all of the items to be 
procured. Included in this affordability analysis are the costs of any 
infrastructure changes that might be necessary, the initial spares needed, 
training necessary for operators and maintainers, etc. Procurement could 
easily account for 35-40% of the TOC. These cost elements are normally 
expressed as: 
• Flyaway cost. Figure 5 above provides a listing of the elements 
considered in the flyaway cost of an F16. This is a sunk cost for 
the existing F16 fleet in the BAAF, but would be a factor in any 
further acquisitions. 
• Recurring Costs. Recurring costs are repetitive elements of 
development and investment costs that may vary with the quantity 
being produced during any program phase. For example, during 
the development phase repetitive production-like costs incurred 
when producing prototype and test units are considered recurring 
costs. Recurring costs include the following: engineering, required 
for redesign, modifications, reliability, maintainability, and 
associated evaluation and liaison; complete reporting elements 
produced either for test or for operational use; tool maintenance, 
modification,   rework,   and   replacement;   training   all   Service 
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personnel to operate and maintain equipment; and reproduction 
and updating of technical data and manuals. 
• Nonrecurring Costs. Nonrecurring costs are those elements of 
development and investment costs that generally occur only once 
in the life cycle of a system. Such costs are often found in 
engineering, system tests, tooling, and pre-production activities, 
and also include basic design and development through the first 
release of engineering drawings and data, all system and subsystem 
test activities, except end item acceptance testing, configuration 
audits, qualification testing, technical publications through initial 
release, basic tool and production planning through initial release, 
all basic tooling, engineering models, partially built units for 
development or test purposes only, units not built to operational or 
tactical configuration, and specialized work force training. 
• Initial Spares. Initial spares are relative to the amount of flying the 
F16 would accomplish during its initial BAAF service. This cost is 
also sunk. 
• Initial Support. The elements included in initial support are again 
described in Figure 5 above. This cost is also sunk for the existing 
Fl6 fleet. 
The  O&S   cost  includes  all   costs   associated  with  the  operations, 
maintenance, and disposal of the F16 aircraft, or the modifications to 
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aircraft or support equipment. O&S costs can be as much as 45-55% of the 
TOC. These cost elements are broken down into:38 
• Mission  Personnel.     This  cost  is  the  flight  crews  and  the 





Unit-level consumption. This is the fuel and other Petroleum, Oil, 
and Lubricants (POL) associated with the aircraft and its support 
equipment. 
Intermediate Maintenance (External to the unit). This cost is the 
maintenance and support costs above the unit level but not at the 
depot. 
Depot Maintenance. This includes all costs associated with depot 
support to the BAAF. 
Contractor Support. This includes the cost of contractor labor, 
materials, and overhead incurred in providing all or part of the 
logistics support required by the F16 weapon system, its 
subsystems, or associated support equipment. 
Sustaining Support. This includes the cost of replacement support 
equipment, modification kits, sustaining engineering, software 
maintenance support, and simulator operations provided for the 
F16 weapon system. 
38
 Department of Defense (DoD) CAIG Aircraft O&S Cost Element Structure. 
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• Indirect Support. Indirect support includes the costs of personnel support 
for specialty training, permanent changes of station, and medical care. 
Indirect support also includes the costs of relevant host installation 
services, such as base operating support and real property maintenance. 
The combination of acquisition and O&S costs (which would include the disposal 
cost) represents the TOC for the F16 weapon system. 
D.       METHODOLOGY 
Knowing what the TOC for the F16 weapon system is only the start of the LCM 
process. The methods used to calculate the various elements of TOC must be known and 
understood. Accounting for all the costs associated with the complete F16 weapon 
system can be a complex process, as shown in Figure 15 below, and require a tremendous 
amount of data. 
The TOC development process is depicted in Figure 16 below. It portrays the 
development of the acquisition values in the upper left that results in the upper right in 
the Life Cycle Cost (LCC). LCC is equivalent to the TOC within the BAAF. 
Simultaneously, the support concept for the system/LRU is determined by the tan color. 
These costs culminate in the values on the right side indicating the O&S costs. The 
summation of the acquisition (Development and Procurement) and the O&S costs result 
in the TOC. The items circled in red are those items that normally occupy the trade space 
for trade studies associated with RTOC and affordability. Trades are very much a part of 
the TOC, especially for the BAAF F16 fleet. These are the actions discussed earlier 
where the BDF and the BAAF have to maintain liaison with the manufacturers, vendors, 
and the US government relative to the upcoming modifications and upgrades that drive 
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the trade study analyses. The results of those analyses must be known and monitored by 
all levels of the F16 organization and the BDF. The results of purchasing those 
modifications/upgrades could well cause a reduction of the TOC (RTOC). 








Figure 15. Methodology for TOC. 
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Figure 16.       TOC Process with Trade Study Space Highlighted. 
This methodology should be broken down into requirements definition, data 
collection, data analyses, cost models selection, cost model input requirements, cost 
model outputs, cost analyses, reports to decision makers, as part of an iterative process to 
find the most affordable product strategy can be derived. 
Requirement definition is conducted by the BAAF and the BDF to identify the 
needs of the BAAF. This can, and usually does, relate to some problem relative to the 
BDF. It results from the evaluation of the defense needs of Bahrain and the shortfalls in 
present systems. 
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Once there is a determined need for some procurement or modification, then data 
collection must occur. The data collection plan must include all information/data 
required to determine the TOC of the system. Coupled with this could be the requirement 
for the Reduction of TOC (RTOC). This is normally brought about through some 
modification or series of modifications to the F16 fleet. By finding better ways/methods 
of producing a given Line Replaceable Unit (LRU) for the F16 weapon system, the TOC 
can be reduced. This reduction normally occurs through different materials or increasing 
the reliability and maintainability of the LRU. Figure 17 below attempts to portray the 
affects of the efforts to reduce the TOC for an LRU. 
TOTAL OWNERSHIP COST 
T 
Figure 17.       Effects of RTOC. 
To further describe the RTOC, Figure 18 below describes a process developed by 
the United States Air Force (USAF) for one of its weapon systems (Fl 17). The Bahrain 
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A Revolution in Product Support 
Legacy 
Support Tasks        Responsibilities 
Organization Level: 
Servicing / Loading 
Diagnostics 
Fault Detection (to LRU/WRA) 
Remove & Replace (LRU/WRA) 
Minor Structural Repair 
Selected Off-Platform Maint. 
(eg, Tires, Batts) 
Intermediate Level: 
Diagnostics / Testing 
Fault Detection (to SRU/SRA) 
Remove & Replace (SRU/SRA) 
Structural Repair 
Minor Mods / TCTOs 
Periodic inspections 
Depot Level: 
Provisioning / Replenishment 
Organic Maintenance & Repair 
Manage Vendor Repair 
MajorStruc. Repair/ Field Tms 
Selected Off-Platform Maint 
Programmed/ Software Maint 
Item Management 
Future 




Remove & Replace (LRU/WRA) 
BAAF BDF Contract 
Figure 18.       Total System Performance Specification (TSPR) for RTOC. 
BDF and the BAAF should seriously consider employ this process.  It is referred to as 
Total System Performance Specifications (TSPR).    It is the method whereby the 
contractor provides the entire support portion of the O&S excluding the indirect costs. 
55 
Other Foreign Military Sales (FMS) countries are also using this methodology. It is the 
equivalent of outsourcing the support to the contractor. The figure below describes the 
process of evolution that is necessary for the RTOC of the support portion of the TOC. 
This evolution begins with the legacy system of support presently used by the B AAF and 
culminates in the support system being totally the responsibility of the contractor. This 
methodology has produced millions of US dollars in saving for the USAF weapon 
system. The quantity of aircraft supported and the support structure is quite similar to 
that of Bahrain. 
E.       COST MODELS 
For any type of TOC analyses, there is a need for cost models.   These models 
make up the "tool box" used by the cost analysts to estimate costs to any level of fidelity 
needed by the decision-makers. They provide Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM) 
estimates down through, and including, very detailed analyses of the TOC. 
There are several types of cost models just as there are various tools in the 
mechanics tool box. Each type of tool serves some purpose. Which tool(s) to use is a 
decision the cost analyst must make based on what the requirement for the cost analysis 
is and how much data is available. Data for the F16 fighter aircraft is quite well known, 
and includes the data generated within the BAAF since its F-16 acquisitions. A couple of 
types of cost models are: 
• Parametric models. Used more frequently when data availability is 
limited. The have a much stronger reliance on the development of Cost 
Estimating Relationships (CER) that is inserted into the model. 
• Grassroots models. Used when plenty of data is available. 
56 
Uses 
• Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM) estimates. 
• Budgetary 
• Life Cycle Management 
There are a host of cost models available in the international market place. 
It is beneficial to use models also used by the US government and the F16 
contractors in order to insure collection and use of data, algorithms, and 
CERs are reasonable. 
TOC Models. These models are used to determine the F16 weapons 
system costs at the system level through, in some cases, the third level of 
indenture of the Cost Estimating Structure (CES). This provides decision 
makers the ability to determine the costs for acquisition or trade studies 
necessary. Some of the cost models in this category are: 
• Parametric Review of Information for Costing & Evaluating 
(PRICE) 
• System Evaluation and Estimation of Resources (SEER) 
• Fighter Life Cycle Cost Model (FLCCM) 
• Cost Analysis Strategy Assessment (CASA) 
O&S Models. These models are used to provide ROM level of fidelity 
through five levels of indenture for CES for the cost analyses of O&S. 
They can be used for the computation of O&S costs at the F16 weapon 
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system level down through the LRU/SRU level.   Some of these type of 
models are: 
System Level Operations & Logistics Support (SOLS) 
Logistics & Operations Support (LOGOS) 
Cost Oriented Resource Estimating Model (CORE) 
Recurring Investment Factors (RIF) 
Fuel Consumption (FC) 
• Software Models.    These models are used to determine the cost of 
software development and maintenance. The cost analyst for the F16 
fighter aircraft must modify the inputs, therefore, the outputs for the 
computation of software maintenance. This must be done since the 
models are built for business type computations and not for fighter aircraft 
operations. Some of these models are: 
• Revised COCOMO (REVIC). 
• Constructive Cost Model (COCOMO). 
F.        TYPICAL OUTPUT SUMMARY FOR TOC 
There are many ways of portraying TOC for the F16 or its LRUs. Table 1 below 
presents one method of providing information to the decision-makers.   The level of 
presentation is dependent on the level of management. For example, a peer review would 
require presentation of the complete set of inputs and outputs with discussions regarding 
the ground rules and assumptions included.     A review for the manager/squadron 
commander would require less detail and more summary.   A review at the program 
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manager/wing commander level would require still more overview of information and 
less detail. The details would be provided as back-up information, if requested. A 
briefing to the Bahrain BDF would be at the highest level and the details would be 
attached. 
Chapter V will present a generic cost analysis of F16 fleet TOC. It will present the 
TOC of the F16 fleet in a manner that the BDF and the BAAF can adapt for its LCM 
management processes. 
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1.0 Development 10% $1,774,691 
Aircraft Design Analysis & Tooling 32% $567,901 
- Procurement 13.0% $73,827 
- Engineering Design & Analysis 12.0% $68,148 
- Tooling 7.0% $39,753 
Test and Test Hardware 39% $692,130 
- Ground Test 9% $62,292 
- Flight Test 10.0% $69,213 
- Test Hardare 20.0% $138,426 
Systems Project Mgmt & Data 11% $195,216 
Support Equipment & Management 18% $319,444 
2.0 Procurement 40% $28,395 K 7,098,765 
Flyaway 81% $23,000 K $5,750,000 
- Recurring Production 90.0% $20,700 K $5,175,000 
* Sustaining Engineering 
* Sustaining Tooling 
* Manufacturing 
* Quality Assurance 
* Logistics 
- Nonrecurring Production 10.0% $2,300 K $575,000 
*GFE 
*ECPs 
* Systems Test & Evaluation (ST&E) 
* Initial Operating Capability (IOC) - Tooling, Facil. 
Initial Support 19% $5,395 K $1,348,765 
- Training 
- Support Equipment 
-Data 
- Initial Spares 
3.0 Operations and Support 50% $8,873,457 
Recurring Investment 59% $5,235,340 
- Replenishment Spares 14.0% $732,948 
- Base Maintenance Support 8.0% $418,827 
- Depot Maintenance 18.0% $924,361 
- Aircraft Modifications 12.0% $628,241 
- Replacement Common Support Equipment 7.0% $366,474 




Personnel 19% $1685,957 
- Aircrews 2.4% $40,463 
- Maintenance 11.9% $200,629 
* Unsched Maintenance 3.80% $7,624 
* General & Support 1 1.50% $3,009 
* Weapons, etc. 3.30% $6,621 
* Support Equipment 2.50% $5,016 
- Support 4.7%   |                           $79,240 
Table 1. A Type of TOC Summary Report. 
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V.      BAAF F-16 TOTAL OWNERSHIP COST 
A.       GROUND RULES AND ASSUMPTIONS 
Now that we have discussed in detail the definitions and use of Life Cycle 
Management (LCM) and Total Ownership Cost (TOC), it is time we discuss specifically 
the Fl 6 fighter aircraft fleet in the BAAF. This chapter is dedicated to discussion of F-16 
costs. It must be recognized that some of the information presented in this chapter will 
be generic in nature due to the sensitivity and classification of some of the relevant 
information. Use of certain BAAF- specific information could possibly disclose classified 
operational procedures. 
As with any cost analysis, the first step in estimating TOC is determination of the 
ground rules and assumptions. These set the stage and insure the cost analyst is 
synchronized with the BDF and the BAAF. Ground rules and assumptions change since 
the reasons for, and the depth of, any given analysis play an important role. Ground rules 
are those hard and fast points normally provided to the analyst. 
At the same time assumptions are determined by analyst and program 
management judgments. These are identified to tell reviewers and decision makers what 
was assumed in order to complete the cost analyses. 
Ground Rules 
Number of Primary Aircraft Authorized(P AA):        22 
Number of squadrons: 2 
Number of wings: 1 
Flight Hours FH Per Aircraft (AC) Per Year: 180 FH 
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Crew Ratio (# crew per # aircraft): 
Pilots per Crew (# total F16 pilots per AC) 
Non pilots per crew (navigators, etc.) 
Enlisted per crew 
Number of pilots in the squadron 
Pilot Turnover Rate: 
Officer Turnover Rate: 
Enlisted Turnover Rate: 
Operational Service Life: 
(FH) 
# F16 Aircraft delivered in Jun 1980: 
# F16 Aircraft delivered in Jun 1990: 
Levels of Maintenance: 
Year Dollars 
Assumptions 
Fuel cost per gallon: 
Organic (US) depot maintenance 
Number of bases: 





8000    Flight    Hours 








Only as required 
$32.30 
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B.        PROCUREMENT 
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) is considered to be the 
development portion of the acquisition cost. It begins at Milestone 0 and continues to the 
production. This is considered a sunk cost for the acquisition and TOC of the weapon 
system (F16). RDT&E becomes applicable in the development of modifications and 
upgrades to the weapon system. 
The Bahrain Defense Force (BDF) and the BAAF were involved in the 
procurement of the F16 fighter aircraft fleet. This occurred in two segments. The first 
segment was the procurement of 10 F16 aircraft in 1980. The second procurement of 12 
F16 fighter aircraft occurred in 1990. Because of the two segments being procured in 
different years, the acquisition cost (RDT&E and Procurement) was different. 
Procurement of the Fl 6 fighter aircraft weapon system is shown in Table 2 below: 
Category of Cost 10 AC (1980) 12 AC (1990) TOTAL 
Fly Away S142.0M $225.6M $367.6M 
Recurring $42.6M $67.8M S110.4M 
Non-Recurring $14.2M $22.6M $36.8M 
Initial Support $28.4M $45.2M $73.6M 
Initial Spares $21.3M $33.9M $55.2M 
PROCUREMENT S248.5M S395.1M $643.6M 
Table 2. Procurement Cost Summary. 
C.        OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT 
The biggest area of leverage for the BDF and the BAAF in Reduction Total 
Ownership Cost (RTOC) is in the area of Operations and Support (O&S). By employing 
the principals of Life Cycle Management (LCM), they can influence the cost of operating 
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and supporting the F16 fleet. Some of the available techniques are included in the 
discussion to follow. The remainder of this chapter is a discussion of the elements 
contained in O&S costs. Also provided are the costs for each sub-category of O&S 
described in squadron format using the USAF Cost Oriented Resource Estimating 
(CORE) Model to calculate the costs. Programmatics included in the determination of 
the squadron annual cost, and subsequently, the TOC for the BAAF are shown in Table 3 
below. 
1.        Personnel 
The personnel element includes the cost of pay and allowances of officer, 
enlisted, and civilian personnel required to operate, maintain, and support a discrete 
operational system or deployable unit. This includes the personnel necessary to meet 
combat readiness, unit training, and administrative requirements. For units that operate 
more than one type of defense system, personnel requirements will be allocated on a 
relative workload basis. Personnel costs will be based on manning levels and skill 
categories. 
1.1. Operations Personnel: These are the pilots and other aircrew members. 
1.2. Maintenance Personnel: Depending on the maintenance concept and 
organizational structure, this element will include maintenance personnel at 
the organizational level and possibly the intermediate-level. 
1.3. Other Mission Personnel: The pay and allowances of military and civilian 
personnel who perform unit staff, security, or other mission support 
functions. 
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OPERATIONS & SUPPORT (O&S) CALCULATIONS FOR BAAF F16 AIRCRAFT 
COST-ORIENTED RESOURCE ESTIMATING (CORE) MODEL V2.0 
Aircraft Description F-16 F-16 
Economic Year Dollars FY $2001 FY $2001 
Date 04/28/01 04/28/01 






Cost input includes maintenance 
personnel? 
No Yes Yes 
Program Factors 
PAA 10 12 
Crew Ratio 1 1 
FH/PAA/YR 180 180 
Pilots/Crew 1 1 
Non-Pilot Officers/Crew 0 0 
Enlisted/Crew 0 0 
Pilot Training Factor $   1,972,011 $     1,972,011 
Manpower Factors 0 340 342 
PPE Officers 0 20 22 
PPE Enlisted 0 320 320 
PPE Civilians 0 0 0 
BOS Officers 1 1 
BOS Enlisted 26 26 
BOS Civilians 8 8 
Unit Staff Officers 4 4 
Unit Staff Enlisted 14 14 
Unit Staff Civilians 0 0 
Security Officers 0 0 
Security Enlisted 12 12 
Civilian Pay $   46,493 $        46,493 $ 46,493 
Program Support Factors 
POL/Dollars per FH $             744 $ 744 
General Systems Spt/FH $            246 $ 246 
Systems Division Spt/FH $             129 $ 129 
Training Ordnance/FH S             176 S 176 
Depot Level Reparables (Fixed and Variable)/FH $          1,687 $ 1,687 
Support Equipment/PAA $        39,861 $ 39,861 
Flyaway Cost ($M) $                19 $ 19 
Depot Maintenance/FH $             107 s 107 
Depot Maintenaince/PAA $        35,138 $ 35,138 
Common Factors 
Overall Officer Turnover 0.0656 0.0656 0.0656 
Non-rated Officer Turnover 0.0695 0.0695 0.0695 
Installation Support Non-Pay $     5,788 $          5,788 $ 5,788 
Officers, Med Non-Pay S     3,022 S          3,022 S 3,022 
Enlisted, Med Non-Pay $     3,022 $          3,022 $ 3,022 
Pilot Turnover 0.0481 0.0481 0.0481 
Non Pilot Aircrew Turnover 0.0736 0.0736 0.0736 
Enlisted Turnover 0.1025 0.1025 0.1025 
Class IV Mod (Safety) Equation /PAA $0 $59,778 $59,778 
Officer Pay $   75,212 $        75,212 $ 75,212 
Enlisted Pay $   38,189 $        38,189 $ 38,189 
Non Aircrew Officer Training $   21,654 $        21,654 $ 21,654 
Enlisted Non Aircrew Training $    15,633 $        15,633 $ 15,633 
Maintenance Personnel 0 300 300 
Organizational Officers 6 6 
Organizational Enlisted 294 294 
Table 3. Input Values for the CORE Model. 
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The annual squadron cost associated with personnel are shown in Table 4 below. 
10-F16 AC bought 1980 12-F16 AC bought in 1990 
Operations Personnel $752,120 $902,544 
Maintenance Personnel $11,678,838 $11,678,838 
Unit Staff Personnel $835,494 $835,494 
Security $458,268 $458,268 
TOTAL Sqdn Pers. $13,724,720 $13,875,144 
Table 4. Squadron Level Annual Personnel Costs. 
2.        Unit Level Consumption 
Unit-level consumption includes the cost of fuel and energy resources; operations, 
maintenance, and support materials consumed at the unit level; stock fund 
reimbursements for depot-level reparables; operational munitions expended in training; 
transportation in support of deployed unit training; temporary additional duty/temporary 
duty (TAD/TDY) pay; and other unit-level consumption costs, such as purchased services 
(e.g., equipment leases and service contracts). 
2.1. Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants (POL): This is the cost of fuel for the 
aircraft and other lubricants used to support the squadron and its 
maintenance. 
2.2. Utilities: The cost of producing/using electricity. 
2.3. Consumable supplies: The costs of material consumed in the operation, 
maintenance, and support of an aircraft system and associated support 
equipment at the unit level. Depending on the maintenance concept or 
organizational structure, consumption at the intermediate level should be 
reported either in this element or in element 3.0, Intermediate Maintenance 
(External to Unit). Costs need not be identified at the level of detail shown 
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below; the descriptions are intended merely to illustrate the various types 
of materials encompassed in this element: 
2.3.1. Maintenance Material. The cost of material expended during 
maintenance. Examples include consumables and repair parts such 
as transistors, capacitors, gaskets, fuses, and other bit-and-piece 
material. 
2.3.2. Operational Material. The cost of non-maintenance material 
consumed in operating a system and support equipment. Examples 
include coolants, deicing fluids, tires, filters, batteries, paper, 
diskettes, ribbons, charts, and maps. 
2.3.3. Mission Support Supplies. The cost of supplies and equipment 
expended in support of mission personnel. Examples include items 
relating to administration, housekeeping, health, and safety. 
2.4. Depot Level Reparable (DLR): The unit-level cost of purchases of 
depot-level reparable (DLR) spares (also referred to as exchangeable) used 
to replace initial stocks. DLRs may include repairable individual parts, 
assemblies, or subassemblies that are required on a recurring basis for the 
repair of major end items of equipment. 
2.5. Training munitions and other training supplies: The cost of expendable 
stores consumed in unit-level training. Includes the cost of live and inert 
ammunition, bombs, rockets, training missiles, sonobuoys, and pyrotechnics 
expended in noncombat operations (such as firepower demonstrations) and 
training exercises. 
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2.6.     Table 5 below demonstrates the annual squadron costs associated with unit 
level consumption. 
Description Value 10 AC Squadron 
Annual Value 
12 AC Squadron 
Annual Value 
POL/Energy Consumption $ $   1,339,200 $      1,607,040 
POL $ $   1,339,200 $      1,607,040 
Consumable Material/Repair Parts $ $      675,000 $         810,000 
Maintenance Material $ $      675,000 $         810,000 
Aircraft Maintenance Material $ $      675,000 $        810,000 
Depot Level Reparables $ $   3,036,600 $     3,643,920 
Training Munitions/Expendable Stores $ $     316,800 $        380,160 
Unit Level Consumption $ $   5,367,600 $     6,441,120 
Table 5. Unit Consumption Squadron Annual Costs. 
3. Intermediate Maintenance 
Intermediate maintenance performed external to a squadron includes the cost of 
labor and material and other costs expended by designated activities/units (third and 
fourth echelon) in support of an aircraft system and associated support equipment. 
Intermediate maintenance activities include calibration, repair, and replacement of parts, 
components, or assemblies, and technical assistance. 
3.1. MAINTENANCE. The pay and allowances of military and civilian 
personnel who perform intermediate maintenance on an aircraft system, 
associated support equipment, and unit-level training devices. 
3.2. CONSUMABLE MATERIAL/REPAIR PARTS. The costs of repair parts, 
assemblies, subassemblies, and material consumed in the maintenance and 
repair of aircraft, associated support equipment, and unit-level training 
devices. 
3.3. OTHER. Include in this element any significant intermediate maintenance 
costs not otherwise accounted for. 
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NOTE: The intermediate costs for BAAF are included in Unit Consumption. 
4.        Depot Level Maintenance 
The labor, material, and overhead costs for overhaul or rework of aircraft returned 
to a centralized depot facility. Includes programmed depot maintenance, analytic 
condition inspections, and unscheduled depot maintenance. Costs of major aircraft 
subsystems that have different overhaul cycles (i.e., airframe, engine, avionics, 
armament, support equipment) should be identified separately within this element. It is 
important to note the majority of depot costs (DLRs) is displayed in the Unit 
Consumption portion of the cost estimate. This is due to the squadrons having to be 
accountable for the LRU repairs/replacement that are sent to the depot. Table 6 below 
identifies the current annual squadron depot maintenance cost. 
Description Value 10 AC Squadron 
Annual Value 
12 AC Squadron 
Annual Value 
Depot Maintenance $ $      543,980 $        652,776 
Table 6. Depot Maintenance Squadron Annual Costs. 
5.        Contractor Support 
Contractor support includes the cost of contractor labor, materials, and overhead 
incurred in providing all or part of the logistics support required by an aircraft system, 
subsystem, or associated support equipment. Contract maintenance is performed by 
» 
commercial organizations using contractor personnel, material, equipment, and facilities 
or government-furnished material, equipment, and facilities. Contractor logistics support 
(CLS) if the support extends over the operational life of a system. Other contractor 
support may be purchased for engineering and technical services. 
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5.1. CONTRACTOR LOGISTICS SUPPORT. Contractor logistics support 
(CLS) includes the burdened cost of contract labor, material, and assets 
used in providing support to an aircraft system, subsystem, and associated 
support equipment. CLS funding covers depot maintenance and, as 
negotiated with the operating command, necessary organizational and 
intermediate maintenance activities. 
5.2. OTHER. Include in this element any contractor support costs not 
otherwise accounted for. For example, if significant, the burdened cost of 
contract labor for contractor engineering and technical services should be 
reported here. 
Notes: 
1. The BAAF assumes responsibility for supporting a weapon system. 
However, contractor support may still be employed in specific functional 
areas, such as sustaining engineering, software maintenance, simulator 
operations, and selected depot maintenance functions. Applicable 
contractor costs should be reported against these elements in the Cost 
Element Structure (CES). To avoid double counting, the contractor 
support element should be annotated to identify any contractor costs that 
are reported in other elements. 
2. There is no contractor support estimated since the aircraft have been in 
BAAF for 11 or more years. 
6.        Sustaining Support 
Sustaining   support   includes   the   cost   of  replacement   support   equipment, 
modification kits, sustaining engineering, software maintenance support, and simulator 
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operations provided for an aircraft system. War readiness materiel is specifically 
excluded. 
6.1. SUPPORT EQUIPMENT REPLACEMENT. The costs incurred to replace 
equipment that is needed to operate or support an aircraft, aircraft 
subsystems, training systems, and other associated support equipment. The 
support equipment being replaced (e.g., tools and test sets) may be unique 
to the aircraft or it may be common to a number of aircraft systems, in 
which case the costs must be allocated among the respective systems. 
6.2. MODIFICATION KIT PROCUREMENT/INSTALLATION. The costs of 
procuring and installing modification kits and modification kit initial 
spares (after production and deployment) required for an aircraft and 
associated support and training equipment.« Includes only those 
modification kits needed to achieve acceptable safety levels, overcome 
mission capability deficiencies, improve reliability, or reduce maintenance 
costs. Excludes modifications undertaken to provide additional operational 
capability not called for in the original design or performance 
specifications. 
6.3. OTHER RECURRING INVESTMENT. Include in this element any 
significant recurring investment costs not otherwise accounted for. 
6.4. SUSTAINING ENGINEERING SUPPORT. The labor, material, and 
overhead costs incurred in providing continued systems engineering and 
program management oversight to determine the integrity of a system, to 
maintain operational reliability, to approve design changes, and to ensure 
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system conformance with established specifications and standards. Costs 
in this category may include (but are not limited to) government and/or 
contract engineering services, technical advice, and training for 
component or system installation, operation, maintenance, and support. 
6.5. SOFTWARE MAINTENANCE SUPPORT. The labor, material, and 
overhead costs incurred after deployment by depot-level maintenance 
activities, government software • centers, laboratories, or contractors for 
supporting the update, maintenance and modification, integration, and 
configuration management of software. Includes operational, maintenance, 
and diagnostic software programs for the primary system, support 
equipment, and training equipment. The respective costs of operating and 
maintaining the associated computer and peripheral equipment in the 
software maintenance activity should also be included. Not included are 
the costs of major redesigns, new development of large interfacing 
software, and modifications that change functionality. 
6.6. SIMULATOR OPERATIONS. The costs incurred to provide, operate, and 
maintain on-site or centralized simulator training devices for an aircraft 
system, subsystem, or related equipment. This may include the labor,. 
material, and overhead costs of simulator operations by military and/or 
civilian personnel, or by private contractors. 
6.7. OTHER. Include in this element any significant sustaining support costs 
not otherwise accounted for. Examples might include the costs of follow- 
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on operational tests and evaluation, such as range costs, test support, data 
reduction, and test reporting. 
6.8.     Table 7 displays the annual sustaining support cost per squadron. 
Description Value 10 AC Squadron 
Annual Value 
12 AC Squadron 
Annual Value 
Support Equipment Replacement $ $     398,610 $        478,332 
Modification Kit 
Procurement/Installation 
$ $     597,780 $        717,336 
Other Recurring Investment $ $ $ 
Sustaining Engineering Support $ $ $ 
Software Maintenance Support $ $ $ 
Simulation Operations $ $ $ 
Sustaining Support $ $     996,390 $     1,195,668 
Table 7. Sustaining Support Squadron Annual Costs. 
7.        Indirect Support 
Indirect support includes the costs of personnel support for specialty training, 
permanent changes of station, and medical care. Indirect support also includes the costs 
of relevant host installation services, such as base operating support and real property 
maintenance. This is an area that can be affected by consolidating some functions and 
locations for the two squadrons and realize some O&S cost savings. This will be 
discussed later. .Table 8 below displays these costs. 
73 
Description Value 10 AC Squadron 
Annual Value 
12 AC Squadron 
Annual Value 
Personnel Support $ $  2,628,659 $      2,824,411 
Medical Support $ $   1,109,156 $      1,115,200 
Medical Support Non-pay/Material $ $   1,109,156 $      1,115,200 
Specialty Training $ $   1,519,504 $      1,709,211 
Pilot Training $ $      948,537 $      1,138,245 
Non-Aircrew Training $ $     570,966 $         570,966 
Non-Aircrew Training Officer $ $         16,554 $           16,554 
Non-Aircrew Training Enlisted $ $     554,412 $         554,412 
Installation Support $ $  3,610,570 $     3,622,146 
Base Operating Support Personnel $ $   1,440,070|       $      1,440,070 
BOS Military Personnel $ $   1,068,126 $      1,068,126 
BOS Civilian Personnel $ $      371,944 $         371,944 
Installation Support Non-Pay Personnel $ $   2,170,500 $      2,182,076 
Indirect Support $ $   6,239,229 S      6,446,557 
Table 8. Indirect Support Squadron Annual Costs. 
D. DISPOSAL 
This captures costs, associated with deactivating or disposing of a military system 
at the end of its useful life. These costs typically represent only a small fraction of a 
system's life-cycle cost and are excluded from most analyses. 
Moreover, disposal cost is difficult to quantify. This is due to several factors, 
including the following First, the weapon system could be sold to another country, 
thereby negating the disposal cost which then becomes an asset and a reduction to the 
TOC. Secondly, the weapon system could be dismantled and used in other areas of the 
BDF. Again, this would constitute an asset because it is being used somewhere else in 
the BDF. But, it would be offset by the cost of dismantling the weapon system. 
Hazardous material costs of disposal are contained in the O&S portion of the cost 
estimate and, therefore, in this portion of the TOC. 
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E.       TOC SUMMARY 
The current annual costs associated with the BAAF F16 fleet is shown in Table 9 
below. 
F16 (1980) F16 (1990) 
Squadron Total ($/YR) $ $ 26,871,919 $   28,611,265 
Annual BAAF Fl 6 Fleet Cost $   55,483,184 
Table 9. Annual BAAF F16 Fleet Cost. 
The TOC remaining for the F16 fleet in the BAAF can therefore be shown in 
millions of US $ in Table 10 below. 
10 AC Sqdn 12 AC Sqdn! 
Squadron Total ($/YR) ($M) $26.9 S28.6! 
Remaining FH of Service 42200 72240 
Remaining Years of Service 23 33 
Squadron Total ($M) $618.05 S944.17 
BAAF TOTAL ($M) for Remaining Life of F16 
Fleet 
$1,562.23 
Table 10 TOC Remaining BAAF F16 Fleet Cost. 
By making some adjustments in the installation operations for the F16 fleet and 
by consolidating some squadron level functions (especially in the intermediate level 
operations),.savings can be realized. Table 11 below shows the CORE cost model input 
changes that the BAAF might possibly make to reduce O&S costs, and therefore reduce 
the TOC. Changed items are shown in bold. By consolidating installation functions, 
reducing base support personnel, utilizing more simulation training, and reducing the 
frequency of replacing support equipment, and downsizing the maintenance and 
operations personnel, substantial savings are potentially available. 
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BAAF BAAF BAAF Adjusted BAAF Adjusted 
Squadron 
#1 
Squadron #2 Squadron #1 Squadron #2 
Manpower Factors 340 342 340 186 
PPE Enlisted 320 320 320 164 
BOS Enlisted 26 26 26 13 
BOS Civilians 8 8 8 4 
Security Enlisted 12 12 12 3 
Training Ordnance/FH $          176 $          176 $                   44 $ 44 
Support Equipment/PAA $    39,861 $      39,861 $            4,983 $ 4,983 
Non Aircrew Officer 
Training 
$    21,654 $     21,654 $ $ - 
Enlisted Non Aircrew 
Training 
$     15,633 $     15,633 $ $ - 
Maintenance Pers 300 300 300 153 
Organizational Enlisted 294 294 294 147 
Table 11.        Recommended Changes in Operations. 
The reductions discussed above results in the savings identified in Table 12 
below. This is the essence of the LCM discussed throughout this paper. By continuous 
management of the fleet costs, adjustments may be found that can further reduce the 
TOC. Included in this management is the monitoring of modifications and upgrades 
being conducted by the USAF that may be useful to the BAAF and create additional 
O&S savings. 
10 AC Sqdn 12 AC Sqdn 
Squadron Total ($/YR) ($M) $25.0 $18.3 
Remaining FH of Service 42200 72240 
Remaining Years of Service 23 33 
Squadron Total ($M) $575.07 $604.92 
BAAF Total ($M) for Remaining Life of F16 Fleet $1,179.99 
Table 12. Revised TOC for F16 BAAF Fleet. 
This suggests a savings of $382.23M US dollars (more than a quarter billion 
dollars) over the remaining life of the F16 fleet.  Possibly more savings can be realized 
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from studies using data based on actual BAAF practices and through continuous 
management of the weapon system. For more details see Appendix A. 
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VI.    BAAF O&S COST DRIVERS 
A.       INTRODUCTION 
There are many factors that affect the TOC of a weapon system. This chapter will 
present those elements that are major factors in the LCM of the TOC. It will discuss 
those items that affect the TOC the most (cost drivers), and will show how decisions 
made by LCM that can positively or negatively affect the TOC. As has been discussed 
earlier, failure to pay attention to these elements will, most probably, result in higher than 
necessary TOC for the BDF and the BAAF. The better the weapon system (F16 lighter 
aircraft and its support) is managed, the better the possibility of having funds for 
additional items within the BDF. These cost drivers, and the reason for them being the 
highest cost drivers, must be continually managed or else dire consequences will occur. 
1.        Definition 
First, it is essential to understand what cost drivers are and what causes them to be 
cost drivers. A cost driver is a program, system characteristic, or parameter that has the 
direct or indirect effect of changing cost. A cost driver may even be another cost element. 
Examples of cost drivers include numbers of systems, numbers of operating sites, 
numbers of systems failures, time to fix broken systems, etc. The cost of operations and 
support is driven by the cost of individual spare parts and by the labor-hour costs of 
operators and maintainers. Thus, one cost category drive another. In some instances, the 
term "cost drivers" means all parameters and characteristics that drive costs; but, in some 
cases, the "cost drivers" is intended to differentiate the parameters/characteristic with the 
most impact on costs. Cost drivers are those costs that create the greatest cost to the 
squadron, the wing, the BAAF, and the BDF. They are normally expressed as the top 25 
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or top 50 cost drivers. Many things and decisions had circumstances result in the creation 
of cost drivers. It must be remembered that there is always going to be a highest cost 
item. This LCM is the natural order of things. This does not mean to imply those 
changes with LCM should surrender without a fight, quite the contrary. Each cost must 
be continually monitored and every attempt made to reduce it to the lowest possible 
value. In this evaluation, the elements that affect that cost must also be monitored. 
These items are: 
2.        Logistics 
(Getting the Right Thing to the Right Place at the Right Time). 
This is the total support provided to the weapon system, regardless of where it is 
performed. This support begins with the decisions of where the support would best serve 
the needs of the BAAF and yet be the most efficient and lowest cost. One of the 
decisions that must be made relates to the support concept employed with the F-16 
weapon.system. Included in the support concept is where will the item being evaluated 
be supported, in-country or out-of-country. 
a.        In-Country 
In country means the item or the function being evaluated will be 
provided/supported within the country of Bahrain. This does not mean that every 
element of the item must be built and stored in Bahrain. Parts of the item may well be 
purchased from a foreign vendor but the support of the item would be accomplished 
within Bahrain. For example, the mission computer may have Line Replaceable Modules 
(LRM) that are built out-of-country but the computer itself, including the maintenance, 
repair, assembly, and testing of the computer would be accomplished in Bahrain. 
80 
b.        Out-of-Country 
The converse to in-country support is out-of-country. This means the item 
is built, maintained, repaired, assembled, and tested out-of-country. The only actions 
taken within Bahrain are the removal, ship, and re-installation of the part. There are 
times when this support solution is the most affordable and probably the lowest cost. For 
example, some parts that are mass produced to service many countries would probably be 
the lowest cost to the BAAF who would only be building a few of the items. Another 
consideration is the complexity of the item. Highly complex assemblages normally are 
best left to the contractor that knows the item the best, and has the greatest experience 
base in the testing and repairing of the item. For these items, it would probably have a 
considerable capital investment for the BDF and the BAAF, to say nothing about the time 
(labor) to test and repair the item due to lack of familiarity with the fault isolation and 
testing processes. 
3. Affordability 
Affordability is the ongoing assessment of a system to ensure that it is operable 
and supportable within LCC guidelines. 
What makes an item affordable? The simplest way of describing this is to say this 
is what the customer / user is willing and capable to pay. A beggar on the street could not 
afford to purchase any home, but a president of a corporation could probably afford a 
mansion. The BAAF could not afford the Air Force found in the US, but could definitely 
afford a better Air Force than the Isle of Capri. The United States Department of Defense 
(DoD), Dr. Gansler, explained this as: 
For many years, a disciplined management approach has existed for 
acquiring systems and material to satisfy Air Force needs. These 
acquisition processes allowed the Air Force to obtain affordable systems. 
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However, these processes are not sufficient to meet today's challenges. 
The Air Force must reduce Total Ownership Cost (TOC) in order to meet 
affordable readiness goals and create investment opportunities. TOC 
includes the cost of research, development, acquisition, test and 
evaluation, operation and support (O&S), and disposal costs. Once these 
costs are identified and understood, the Air Force can: 1) identify system 
design/sustainment options ("trade space"); 2) determine where 
waste/non-value added processes exists; and 3) make smart decisions to 
reduce future costs, eliminate waste, and recapture dollars. 
A team effort is required to effectively implement significant cost 
reductions. PM's, field activities, depots, MAJCOMs (Major Command), 
and Air Staff are all part of the team, and they all control costs either 
directly or indirectly. No single activity has direct control over all costs. 
The PM can serve as a focal point to gather and present information to 
show the history, current status and trends of his/her program's posture. 
TOC is an important concept and requires everyone's understanding. By 
working together as a team, the Air Force can make the changes needed to 
maintain readiness required supporting national objectives and sustaining 
the Air Force well into the 21st century.39 
This must be expanded to relate to Foreign Military Sales (FMS) as well. We all 
need to work together in order to achieve the best affordability for Bahrain as well as the 
US. 
Acquisition management system provides a streamlined, event-driven 
management structure that emphasizes risk management and affordability. It explicitly 
links milestone decisions to demonstrated accomplishments. The activities that are 
managed by this system are illustrated in Figure 19. 
39
 Air Force Reduction in Total Ownership Cost (R-TOC); CAIV/TOC Guidebook; (Version 1.0): 27 
May 1999, Dr. J. Gansler. 
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Devetopm&m ' Verification       Production      -Deployment 
Training Operations        Support Disposal 
Figure 19.       Acquisition Management Activities40. 
The following issues should be addressed early in the acquisition cycle to meet 
operational requirements and to reduce life-cycle costs: 
a.        Reliability 
The probability that an item will perform its intended functions for a 
specified period under stated conditions. Simply stated, it is how long the system can 
work. Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) is commonly used to define the total 
functioning life of a population of an item during a specific measurement interval divided 
by the failures during that interval. The failure rate (Greek letter lambda) is defined as the 
number of item failures of per measure of unit life. 
40
 Air Force Instruction (AFI) 65-503, Cost Planning Fact. 
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Failure rate can be calculated as follows: 
Failure rate = 1/MTBF (failures over time) 
(Failure rates of components in series are additive) 
Reliability can be further broken down into mission reliability and 
logistics reliability: 
• Mission Reliability. The probability that a system will perform mission- 
essential functions for a period of time under the conditions stated in the 
mission profile. Measures of mission reliability include only those 
incidents affecting mission accomplishment. 
• Logistics reliability is the probability that no corrective maintenance or 
unscheduled supply demand will occur following the completion of a 
specified mission profile. 
Reliable systems result in increased combat capability while requiring 
fewer spare parts and personnel. Maintainable systems require fewer people and 
specialized skills; it also reduces maintenance times. These reductions result in lower 
ownership costs. The advantages go beyond the system itself. Large, complex combat 
support structures are vulnerable to attack. Reliable systems mean reduced dependence 
on airlift and pre-positioning. Reliability requirements address both mission reliability 
and logistics reliability. 
Simply put, how often an item breaks is an indication of that item's 
reliability.  A high reliability means the part can go for a long period of time before it 
breaks or needs maintenance. Obviously, the higher the reliability is, the more desirable 
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the item becomes. One problem associated with a high reliability is that it more than 
likely will cost considerably. Therefore, as is with any budgeting process, the 
determination must be made regarding what level of reliability is affordable. However, 
there are many things that can increase the reliability of an item without it being cost 
prohibitive. Advances in technology is certainly one way of improving the reliability of 
the item. Another is to allow the manufacturer to maintain their item but maintain form, 
fit, function, and integration (F3I) under a contractor type contract. This would, in 
essence, mean the contractor would be incentivized to improve the reliability of the item. 
Reliability data is gathered and provided in a host of ways, such as the RAMDATA 
report provided by the USAF. It is totally impossible to even begin to discuss the 
complete reliability data collected by the USAF. However, Figure 20 below is a sample 
set of the RAMDATA database to illustrate the data available. The LCM must 
continually monitor the reliability of the F-16 weapon system. This would hopefully 
result in identification of those items which need further attention with the purpose of 
improving the reliability to an acceptable level. The less the item breaks, the less cost of 
having to remove the item, ship the item (if necessary), and repair the item. 
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CND BCS 
wuc CND EVENTS RATE BCSSHOP SHOP RATE 
AC 2279 16550 0.1377 436 3704 0.1177 
74A 208 754 02759 56 303 0.1848 
74AH0 . 0 . . 0 
74AM0 12 90 0.1333 5 50 0.1 
74ANP 0 1 0 0 0 0 
74AN0 6 130 0.0462 25 92 0.2717 
74AP0 4 127 0.0315 .  '"15 96 0.1563 
74AQ0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
74ASA 0 1 0 0 0 0 
74ASC . 0 . . 0 
74ASD 0 3 0 0 0 0 
74ASE 1 , 4 0.25 0 1 0 
74ASG 0 1 0 0 0 0 
74AS0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
74AT0 0 ;       A o 0 0 0 
74AÜ0 0 ■;..■■ 4 0 0 0 0 
74AV0 1 2 0.5 0 0 0 
74AY0 14 145 0.0966 ■■--'."■',■■.■:■■•:!! 62 0.1774 
74A00 169 224 0.7545 0 1 0 
74A99 1 17 0,0588 0 0 0 
Figure 20.       Sample Set of RAMDATA. 
b.        Maintainability 
The probability that if prescribed procedures and resources are used, an 
item will be retained in, or restored to, a specific condition within a given period. It is the 
inherent characteristic of a finished design that determines the amount of maintenance 
required to retain or restore the system into a specified condition. Corrective maintenance 
can be measured by Mean Time to Repair (MTTR); or, stated in more simple terms, how 
quickly and easily the system can be fixed. Also, Mean Maintenance Time (MMT) not 
only includes corrective maintenance but also accounts for preventive maintenance. 
As with reliability, maintainability must be closely managed by the LCM 
process.     Here,  Bahrain must find  the delicate balance  between the operational 
requirements and the logistics maintaining the item.   Maintainability is the amount of 
time used to maintain, remove, repair, test, and reinstall.   Again, there is a need for 
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balance between the operational requirements (Mission Ready status, etc.) and the cost of 
the maintainability support. The right number of personnel, with the right skills, in the 
right place are some of the factors that must be considered by the LCM. 
c.        Supportability 
This is where the decisions such as those discussed earlier are determined 
and continuously evaluated. Whether or not to have an item supported in-country or out- 
of-country is one aspect of supportability. Another aspect is those items discussed earlier 
about the possible savings that can be realized by the consolidation of functions and the 
elimination of duplicate functions. LCM must continually monitor the support system to 
insure it is providing the highest possible supportability to the BDF and the BAAF. A 
support plan is necessary that would address each and every support requirement with 
regards to who is going to perform the function, where will the function be performed, 
when will this support be available, how many support personnel are required, etc. 
An important aspect is the early integration of supportability 
considerations into the system design concept. As illustrated in Figure 21 the decisions 
made during impact approximately 60% of total life cycle costs. As shown in Figure 22, 
much of these costs are incurred during the operations and support phase. 
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Figure 22.       Nominal Cost Distribution of a Typical Program. 
The supportability of the F-16 weapon system is also predicated on one 
subject that should be singled out due to it being one of the cost drivers of the system, 
that of software maintenance. A tremendous amount of effort and LCM goes into the 
control,  management,  and  decision making  of software  maintenance.     Software 
maintenance is described as: 
The labor, material, and overhead costs incurred after initial deployment 
by the depot level maintenance activity government software centers. 
laboratories, or contractors for supporting the update, maintenance, and 
diagnostic software programs for the primary system, support equipment 
and training equipment. The respective costs of operating and maintaining 
the associated computer and peripheral equipment in the software 
maintenance activity should also be included.   Costs that should not be 
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included are major redesigns, new development of large interfacing 
software and modifications that change functionality.41 
Model and Simulation (M&S) supports the transition from design to initial 
production and testing. Engineering level models are used for performance analysis, test 
planning, and test support.    Figure 23 below describes the methodology used in 
conducting M&S. 
Figure 23.       Virtual M&S Design in the System Life Cycle. 
Software development occurs at the beginning of the life cycle, Milestone 
0. The software packages necessary for the Bahrain F-16 weapon system to be 
operational was provided in the initial support package. Thus, a core capability is 
fielded, where the system is designed modularly, and provisions are made for upgrades 
and changes. This started the period of software maintenance for the BAAF. Figure 24 
illustrates Pressman's interpretation of the evolutionary model where a first generation 
41
 DoDD 5000.1, Chapter 5 System Life Cycle and Methodologies 5.1 - Life Cycle Process and 
Decision Making. 
90 
spiral evolves into an extended second generation spiral, and so on.42 This continues 
throughout the life cycle of the weapon system except the last few years prior to disposal 
where it would not be economically feasible to perform any more software modifications 
or upgrades (i.e. software maintenance). As can be readily seen, strong and effective 
LCM must be employed to manage the software maintenance of the weapon system, 
which includes the F-16 aircraft and all of its support equipment. 
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Figure 24.       Evolutionary Life Cycle Generations. 
42
 Guidelines for Successful Acquisition and Management of Software-Intensive Systems:: Volume 1 
- Version 3.0; May 2000,5.6.1 ~ Evolutionary Method. 
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Evolutionary programs progress towards an ultimate capability. This 
strategy requires the development of increments of software that are demonstrable to the 
BAAF, which is involved throughout the entire development process, as illustrated in 
Figure 25. It must be remembered that each software modification and upgrade requires 
development to some degree. This causes the software to remain involved in the 
evolutionary process and causes the continuation of the LCM for the software. BAAF 
must work closely with other FMS countries using the F-16 to effect and control the 
software modifications being made. It is in the BDF and BAAF interest to enter into 
some software maintenance agreements for co-payment with the USG and the FMS 
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Figure 25.       User Involvement in the Evolutionary Method43. 
4j
 Guidelines for Successful Acquisition and Management of Software-Intensive Systems:: Volume 1 
• Version 3.0; May 2000. 5.6.1 - Evolutionary Method. 
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When used effectively, the evolutionary model can provide significant 
interrelated benefits. Examples of benefits include the following: 
• Improved requirements. Requirements for software modifications can be 
generated by the addition of other capabilities, such as a new missile, 
radar, etc. 
• Technology insertion. In the world today, technology is moving forward 
at a very high rate of speed. It would not be economically possible to keep 
up with all the technologies being developed. 
• Management control and program visibility. Once again, the process of 
good and effective LCM must be employed. Only those essential 
technologies that fit with the BDF and BAAF defense plans should be 
considered for purchase. 
• Improved system quality. The continuous concentration on BDF and 
BAAF requirements normally is executed through the LCM process 
integrating with the developer (probably, the USG and the USAF). This 
BAAF involvement results in improved system quality. 
d.        Availability 
Based on the question, "Is the equipment available in a working condition 
when it is needed?" Availability is defined as the probability that an item is in an 
operable and commitable state at the start of a mission when the mission is called for at a 
random point in time. The user is most concerned about this parameter. This reflects the 
readiness of the system. There are a number of definitions of availability, and it is 
important to understand the basic ones. All are based on this standard mathematical 
93 
relationship, with differing definitions of the terms "Up Time;" "Down Time;" and "Total 
Time": 
Availability = A =  Up Time  = Up Time  
Total Time Up Time + Down Time 
One measure in particular. Operational Availability (Ao), covers all time 
segments the equipment is intended to be operational. As seen by the following equation, 
operational availability is based on a mathematical relationship among three 
characteristics: reliability, maintainability, and the effectiveness of the logistics support 
system. Reliability is measured as the mean operating time plus mean standby time in an 
operational condition (represented by Mean Time Between Maintenance (MTBM)). 
Maintainability includes the mean maintenance time for both corrective and preventive 
actions (represented by Mean Maintenance Time (MMT)). Logistics support 
effectiveness is the combination of the logistics delay time plus any administrative delays 
(represented by Mean Logistics Down Time (MLDT)). The Mean Time Between 
Maintenance (MTBM) is based on all maintenance actions, whether corrective or 
preventative in nature. 
4.        Training 
Training consideration begins at Milestone 0 and continues throughout the life of 
the system. Initial training must be well thought out in all aspects such as:  Who needs 
the training, how often should the training be conducted, where should it be conducted. 
In Bahrain, the pilots and support personnel had to be trained prior to the receipt of the F- 
16 fighter aircraft. These personnel became responsible for the training of the follow-on 
personnel.    Personnel who were trained on other aircraft would receive a different 
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training course than those who have never been with another aircraft. Some of the items 
for consideration are shown below: 
Pilot initial training 
Pilot cross training 
Pilot refresher training 
Crew initial training 
Crew cross training 
Crew refresher training 
Maintainer initial training 
Maintainer cross training 
Training device procurement 
Training device operations 
Training device upgrades, modifications, repair 
B.       IDENTIFICATION OF COST DRIVERS 
Cost drivers are determined by using historical data to demonstrate and identify 
those costs that are creating the highest costs. Data collection and good LCM will 
produce the information needed to identify these drivers. By identification of the drivers, 
LCM practices and policies can be brought to bear on trying to reduce these cost to 
maximum extent possible. 
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Figure 26 below identifies collected information on cost drivers for the F-16 
aircraft. These cost drivers change due to the impact of LCM being applied. LCM 










Removal     % of 
Rate per 100   total 
Flight Hours 
AC 
13DAO Main Landing Gear Wheel/Tire Assy 548 0 4.908 3.3 
13KAO Main Landing Gear Wheel/Tire Assy 625 0 1.866 3.8 
42GAA Battery, Aircraft 205 0 1.836 1.2 
13DBO Nose Landing Gear Wheel/Tire Assy 181 0 1.621 1.1 
74NOO Lantim Targeting Pod 241 14 1.266 1.5 
13KAB Tire 345 0 1.03 2.1 
Figure 26.       Sample Set of Removal Rate for Suspected Failure. 
It is important to realize the above information is a small sample set of the data 
collected on the Fl6 aircraft. For proper LCM to be employed, this type of reliability 
data must be evaluated continuously. Failure to do this would result in the continuation 
of the high cost drivers without possible reduction. This, surely, would result in higher 
than necessary O&S costs. It is essential within the BAAF that every effort, by the 
BAAF and by the USAF, be brought to bear on the reduction of these costs to the bare 
minimum. Some costs are very difficult to reduce within an active fleet, such as the 
batteries and tires. Of course, over a period of time, even those costs can be reduces as 
research and development produces new techniques and technologies that could be 
brought to bear. 
C.       DISCUSSION 
There are many items to consider regarding the LCM of a weapon system.  No 
longer is it acceptable to simply operate the weapon system.  The system must be ready 
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to go at any time. Many decisions had to be made by the BAAF at the time of purchase 
of the F-16 aircraft. There are also many decisions that must be accomplished every day. 
At no time, should there be a situation of complacency allowed to develop in the 
operational and support structure involved in the F-16 for the BAAF. There are 
thousands of items to be managed that belong to the F-16. BAAF must continue to find 
ways to monitor and collect data necessary for LCM to properly perform. Each squadron 
must evaluate its operational procedures to insure there are no redundancies that can be 
eliminated. Each squadron must be held fiscally accountable for its operation. Data 
collection efforts must be continuously monitored to insure accurate data available to 
management Support is not something that simply happens as a by-product of an 
acquisition. It must be meticulously developed and monitored. Each squadron in the 
BAAF must be aware of the cost drivers and how that came about. They must be 
involved in the reduction of costs across the board, not just with the cost drivers. Failure 
to pay strict attention will result in excessive expenditures. 
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Vn.   CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
A.       CONCLUSION 
This thesis presents a general scheme for Life Cycle Management (LCM) in the 
Bahrain Defense Force (BDF) and Bahrain Amiri Air Force (BAAF), with specific 
attention paid to the F16 fighter weapon system. Life Cycle Management (LCM) is a 
very effective tool to identify, track, and manage the Total Ownership Cost (TOC) if 
decision makers such as wing commanders know how to use it and implement it 
properly. 
LCM is the language that best deals with Reduction in Total Ownership Cost (R- 
TOC). The Bahrain Defense Force (BDF), represented by the Bahrain Amiri Air Force 
(BAAF), can utilize Life Cycle Management (LCM) to a great advantage in reducing its 
Total Ownership Cost (TOC). LCM is a management technique designed to manage and 
control all aspects of any program. In this thesis, discussion of LCM is concentrated on 
the Bahrain Amiri Air Force (BAAF) F-16 fighter aircraft fleet. Even though the F-16 
fleet was purchased years ago, there are many modifications and upgrades that are 
currently ongoing, both within the United States Air Force (USAF), other countries, and 
the BAAF. The adaptation and employment of LCM principles can help avoid 
unnecessary BDF expenditures. To realize this potential, processes must be put in place 
and refined that will identify cost drivers and other high expenses. Through LCM, these 
drivers and expenses can be examined and analyzed to look for and find solutions that 
may reduce or save assets, budget funds being one of them. Efficiency and proficiency is 
another result of proper development and use of LCM processes. 
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B.        RECOMMENDATION 
Before listing the recommendations that can help the BAAF in implementing and 
utilizing LCM, I would like first to identify and analyze four critical challenges that the 
BAAF encounter which have a direct impact on employing the LCM. The BAAF address 
these challenges energetically in order to gain the maximum benefit from applying the 
LCM. These four challenges are as follow: 
1.        Logistics 
Obviously every unit or any air force, must keep its supply readily available to 
support operations during unexpected circumstances or emergency. To maintain 
operational capability, the BAAF has to address the problem of cost and delay in 
turnaround of the spare parts sent for out-of-country repair. Also, the long time it takes to 
order new spare parts, plus unexpected failures, and grounding the aircraft, must be taken 
into account. This lost time means delayed training for both pilots and technicians. These 
kinds of problems confuse and complicate the operational and administrative situation for 
both maintenance and operations. Logistics deficiencies generate undesired options of 
canceling the missions or operations, and forces cannibalization. Though sometimes 
necessary, cannibalization is very risky, because of the probability that the cannibalized 
part could break is quite high. 
2. Training 
Military forces need a lot of time to "digest" and deal with a new weapon or 
system. In many cases, a great deal of money has to be spent acquiring the skills and 
experience necessary to maintain and use a complex weapon or system effectively. The 
BAAF is one of those organizations. A lot of money was spent to offer quality training 
for both pilots and technicians. To complicate matters, training was not always available 
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or could not be accomplished in Bahrain. Lack of funding sometimes caused more 
difficulties in acquiring very much needed training. 
Training is a never-ending requirement regardless of individual experience. 
Examples are training pilots to the level of experience, confidence, and proficiency to 
deal effectively with the enemy which requires fuel, bombs, missiles, and bullets for 
practicing. This is expensive. Also, each pilot needs time and training to acquire the arts 
and tactics of the air-to-air battle. For the maintenance technician, a lot of training is 
required to become competent at diagnosing and troubleshooting his assigned system. 
Problem solving and proper repair of defective components also requires extensive 
training depending on the repair level. Speed of repair is also needed at some levels of 
maintenance, which requires ongoing training to accomplish the task correctly and 
quickly. 
3. Up-Grades and Technology 
Bahrain, like other countries, has to keep pace with changes and up-grades or 
otherwise watch its systems degrade and become ineffective. The BAAF F-16 aircraft has 
already completed 10 years of service. To keep the BAAF F-16 fleet hardware up-to- 
date, the challenges of upgrading are being met with the "FALCON-UP" program. 
Intelligent upgrades require sensitive decisions and precise accounting, since the 
program is both costly and critical. Second, a plan must be created to manage the F-16 for 
its entire life in service through retirement. How much it will cost has to be addressed and 
studied. What other alternatives and options are available must be looked at. 
4. Manpower 
The BAAF today is continuously expanding and the scarcity of trained manpower 
available constitutes an obstacle. It also imposes significant pressure on the existing 
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maintenance force. Therefore, a plan is needed to manage and overcome the ongoing 
manpower problem, especially after the arrival of the second new wave of F-16 aircraft. 
When making the decision to acquire the F-16 aircraft for the Bahrain Defense 
Force (BDF) and the Bahrain Amiri Air Force (BAAF), an immediate problem was 
where to obtain skilled manpower to adequately staff a multitude of jobs needed to 
support F-16 aircraft. Local personnel with management experience, pilot skills, aircraft 
electronic and mechanical skills, plus supply, munitions, and other expertise were 
immediately identified for initial cadre training. However, personnel will need to be 
constantly trained throughout the life cycle of the F-16 aircraft. Trained replacement 
personnel are continually needed because of promotions, retirements, and many other 
reasons. With limited manpower resources available, active in-service personnel, local 
recruitment screened for training, and even foreign recruitment, Life Cycle Management 
(LCM) must constantly monitor and project manpower requirements in a timely manner 
to maintain uninterrupted support for the F-16 aircraft. 
Therefore, after the discussion of challenges facing Bahrain Amiri Air Force, the 
BAAF should consider the methods in this thesis and adopt those which are most 
promising. The following points need the attention of the Bahrain Defense Force (BDF) 
and the BAAF in order to get the highest benefit from implementing the LCM in their 
system: 
• The BDF and the BAAF should consider management practices which 




The BAAF should consider adopting policies, procedures and rules for 
implementing LCM, consistent with its needs and circumstances- with the 
aim of improving cost and schedule performance. 
The BAAF must continue to find ways to monitor and collect data 
necessary for LCM to properly perform. 
The BAAF should establish an office to monitor, track, record, and 
forecast operating and support cost (O&S) of the F-16. 
The BDF should establish or assign an office for auditing to monitor, track 
and record all the O&S expenditures in the country and outside the 
country. 
The BAAF, represented by the maintenance department, should receive 
monthly and yearly reports containing details relating to F-16 expenditures 
in order to be up to date with any changes in terms of expenditures. 
The BAAF should identify the key O&S cost drivers for the F-16 Aircraft 
and use appropriate LCM practices to find ways to reduce and save assets. 
A plan should be put into place to forecast and identify the critical items 
that have direct impact on the readiness of the aircraft. 
A long run training plan needs to be put in place by reviewing, identifying 
and analyzing requirements in order to ensure adequate funding. 
The BAAF should monitor and project trained manpower requirements in 
a timely manner to maintain continuous support for the F-16 aircraft. 
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APPENDIX A. CORE COST MODEL USED IN THE ANALYSIS 
The Cost Oriented Resource Estimating Model (CORE) model is found on the 
Internet and was made available by the USAF. CORE is designed to provide a cost- 
estimating technique to be used to develop aircraft O&S cost estimates. CORE uses data 
available from standard USAF data systems (consistency). It allows the estimating 
techniques to vary as the program progresses through the phases of acquisition 
(flexibility), and it estimates all common O&S cost elements (completeness). It uses the 
format, cost element structure, and procedures generally required for milestone briefings 
(usefulness). 
It is a high level O&S cost model but serves the purpose for this thesis. It allows 
for comparison analyses between variation between support concepts which is helpful in 
LCM and TOC evaluations. There are other, more detailed, models available for detailed 
cost analyses. Results using GENERIC information are presented below. The BDF 
considers this data to be highly sensitive. Squadron 2 has been adjusted to show possible 
savings discussed in Chapter V. 
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i ! Squadron 1 Sqdn2 1 | Aircraft Description jF-16 F-16 1 
4/28/1 Economic Year Dollars FYS2001 
-1 |Date (04/28/01 ! 04/28/01 |                               ; 
*Inputs                                                                         ; ■. j 
Input No 
Code 
CAIG Description jF-16             Del 
J1980 
IF-16              Del.! Reference 
1990                      Information 
I I Program Factors 1 
Fl IPAA 10 12| BAAF Input 
F2 I Crew Ratio 1 If '  BAAF Input 
F3 (FH/PAA/YR ~   180 180| BAAF Input 
F4 (Pilots/Crew 1 If B.AAF Input             1 
F5 INon-Pilot Officers/Crew Of .«BAAF Input             I 
F6 i Enlisted/Crew 0 0 IjBAAF Input             | 
F7 Pilot Training Factor S    493,003 IS 493,003 1BAAF Input             | 
F8 Non-Pilot Tng Factor 
- -; 1 BAAF Input             I 
F9 En I Tng Fac 
- - j BAAF Input             ! 
~! BAAF Input             | 
31 Manpower Factors 340 186 -II BAAF Input             i 
F10 PPE Officers 20 22 || BAAF Input             j 
Fll PPE Enlisted 320 164 :?| BAAF Input             j 
F12 PPE Civilians 0 \ ■    0 IBAAF Input             j 
F13 BOS Officers 1 1 1 i BAAF Input             j 
F14 BOS Enlisted 26 I 13 ill BAAF Input              \ 
F15 BOS Civilians 8 t 4; I BAAF Input              1 
F22 Unit Staff Officers 4 4; BAAF Input              j 
F23 Unit Staff Enlisted 14 I 14 7 BAAF Input 
F24 Unit Staff Civilians 0 j .0 BAAF Input 
F25 Security Officers 0 I 0 .: B.AAF Input 
F26 Security Enlisted 12 I 3 ■ BAAF Input 
F28 Other Staff Officers | :
 BAAF Input 
F29 Other Staff Enlisted { ' BAAF Input 
F30 Other Staff Civilians : BAAF Input 
F31 Civilian Pay S      46.493 iS 46.493         | .;■ BAAF Input             1 
BAAF Input 
III Program Support Factors BAAF Input 
F35 POL/DollarsperFH S           744 IS 744 BAAF Input 
F36 General Systems Spt/FH ;S 246 BAAF Input             j 
F37 Systems Division Spt/FH IS 129 ..BAAF Input             j 
F38 Training Ordnance/FH S             44 IS 44 1 BAAF Input             j 
F40 Depot Level Reparables (Fixed and Variable)/ FH IS 1.687         ; BAAF Input              1 
F4! Support Equipment/PAA is 4.983 • BAAF Input             i 
F42 Flyaway Cost (SM)                                    | S             19 Is 19 BAAF Input             j 
F43 Depot Maintenance/FH IS 107 • BAAF Input 
F44 Depot Maintenance/PAA !S 35.138 BAAF Input 
F45 Contractor Logistics Support/FH |S - BAAF Input 
F46 Contractor Logistics Support/PAA IS - : BAAF Input 
' BAAF Input 
IV Common Factors BAAF Input 
F48           ■ Overall Officer Turnover 0.0656 0.0656 BAAF Input 
F49 Non-rated Officer Turnover 0.0695 0.0695 BAAF Input 
F50 Installation Support Non-Pay                       | S        5.788 IS 5.788 • BAAF Input 
F55 Officers. Med Non-Pav S        3.022 IS 3,022         .;■ BAAF Input 
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F56 Enlisted, Med Non-Pay S        3,022 S     3,022 '.... BAAF Input 
¥57 Officers, Acquisition S S n BAAF Input 
F5S Enlisted, Acquisition s S §1 BAAF Input 
F59 Pilot Turnover 0.0481 0.0481 BAAF Input 
F60 Non Pilot Aircrew Turnover 0.0736 0.0736 BAAF Input 
F61 Enlisted Turnover 0.1025 0.1025 BAAF Input 
F65 Class IV Mod (Safety) Equation /PAA S      59,778 S    59778 CER per equation 
using Fly Away Cost 
above. CORE Model 
description. 
F66 Officer Pay S      75,212 S   75,212 IRE BAAF Input 
F67 Enlisted Pay S      38,189 S   38.189 BAAF Input 
F68 Non Aircrew Officer Training S S BAAF Input 
F69 Enlisted Non Aircrew Training s s BAAF Input 
BAAF Input 
V Maintenance Personnel. 300 153 |P§ BAAF Input 
F70 Organizational Officers 6 H|BAAF Input 
F71 Organizational Enlisted 147 (jJBAAFTnput 
F72 Organizational Civilians ii BAAF Input 
F73 Intermediate Officers BAAF Input 
F74 Intermediate Enlisted ä*P BAAF Input 
F75 Intermediate Civilians BAAF Input 
F76 Ordnance Officers BAAF Input 
F77 Ordnance Enlisted BAAF Input 
F79 Other Officers ?M BAAF Input 
F80 Other Enlisted BAAF Input 
F81 Other Civilians *Zr BAAF Input 
BAAF Input 
VI Depot Maintenance File lK BAAF Input |                                         ! 
i                                                                                                                  J                                                                                            * VII Miscellaneous Factors 
■■:■ 




1.0 Unit Mission Personnel SI3,724,720 S 7,917,660 
1.1 Operations $    752.120 S    902444 
1.1.1 Aircrew S    752,120 S    902,544 
p 
\2 Maintenance 511,678,838 S 6,065,055 
1.2.1 Organizational Maintenance $11,678,838 S 6,065,055 
1.2.1.1 Org Military Pay $11,678,838          |$ 6,065,055 
1.2.1.2 Org Civilian Pay *P                                *"                    |*P                                *" 1 
1.2.2 Intermediate Maintenance S                       IS             - i 
1.2.2.1 Int Military Pay S                       |$ i 
1.2.2.2 Int Civilian Pay S                       |$ i 
1.2.3 Ordnance Maintenance S                       |S i 
1.2.3.1 Ord Military Pay S             -        1$ i 
1.2.4 Other Maintenance Personnel S             -        IS i 
1.2.4.1 Other Military Pay S                       |$ 
1.2.4.2 Other Civilian Pay- S                       |$             - 
1 
1.3 Other Mission Personnel S 1,293,762          |$    950,061 
1.3.1 Unit Staff S    835,494         IS    835,494 
1.3.1.1 Unit Staff Military Pay S    835,494          |S    835,494 
1.3.1.2 Unit Staff Civilian Pay S                       IS 
1.3.2 Security S    458,268          IS     114,567 
1.3.2.1 Security Military Pay S    458.268          IS     114,567 
1.3.3 Other MsnJPers. S                         IS 
1.3.3.1 Other Military Pay S              -        IS 
1.3.3.2 Other Civilian Pay S                        IS %               \ 
1 ®                                            s 
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2.0 [Unit Level Consumption iS 5.130.000 !S 6,156.000 j 
2.1 iPOL/Energy Consumption iS 1.339.200 (S 1,607,040 i 
2.1.1 [POL iS 1.339,200 IS 1,607,040 1 
2.1.2 [Field Generated Electricity iS IS i f 
2.1.3 | Commercial Electricity (S IS 
2.2 (Consumable Material/Repair Parts iS    675,000 IS    810,000 
2.2.1 (Maintenance Material (S    675,000 !$    810,000 
2.2.1.1 (Aircraft Maintenance Material (S    675.000 !$    810,000 1 
2.2.2 j Operational Material :S ;S t                                    ! 
2.2.3 (Mission Support Supplies s iS 
2.3 (Depot Level Reparables S 3,036.600 (S 3.643,920 
2.4 (Training   Munitions / Expendable Stores S      79,200 ;S      95,040 i 
2.5 (Other Unit Level Consumption (Other Misc. 
i 
Factor) | 
l                !                                                                   i                             : ;                          ; 
3.0 Intermediate Maintenance (External to unit) S [S 1                          i 
3.1 Int Maintenance s IS 
3.1.1 Int Maint Military Pay s IS 
3.1.2 Int Maint Civilian Pay s |S 
3.2 Consumable Material/Repair Parts s is 1                                                  i 
j.j Int Maint Other (Other Misc. Factor) (Line item provided 
(to use with Other    i 
Misc. Factor (Fl33)i 
if linked.                 1 
|                                  ! i 
4.0 Depot Maintenance S    543,980 IS    652.776 ■                               j 
4.1 Overhaul/Rework S ,S 
4.1.1 Airframe s (S              -         I 1 
4.1.2 Engine Rework s IS 
4.1.3 Component Repair s IS ! 
4.1.4 Support Equipment                                      ; s IS 
4.1.5 Modifications                                              i s IS 1                                   .                        j 
4.2 Other Depot Maintenance s IS               -         i i                                                          1 
4.2.1 General Depot Support                               | s iS 1                                                           t 
4.2.2 Second Destination Transportation               | s IS |                                                           | 
4.2.3 Contracted Unit Level Support s IS 1                                                            I 
1                                                                    1                             i 1                                                          I i                                                            I 
5.0 Contractor Support                                      |S is ;                                   1 
5.1 Interim Contractor Support                          | s is < 
5.2 Contractor Logistics Support                        1 s is            -       I 
5.3 Other Contractor Support (Other Misc. Factor ) 1 
1 
6.0 Sustaining Support                                      j S    647,606 IS    777,128 
6.1 Support Equipment Replacement                  | S      49,826 |S      59.792 I 
6.2 Modification Kit Procurement/Installation     ) S    597,780 |S     717.336 
6.3 Other Recurring Investment                        [ S (S ! 
J6.4 Sustaining Engineering Support                   j S IS  , i 
■6.5 Software Maintenance Support                     j s iS 
6.6 Simulation Operations                               |S IS 
6.7 Other Sustaining Support (Other Misc. Factor) 
i                    i                    1! 
7.0 Indirect Support                                          | S 4.956.860 IS 2.827.399          |. 
7.1 Personnel Support                                       | S 1,346,290 |S    889.006          t 1 
7.1.1 Medical Support                                        j 5 1,109.156 |S     604.444          |:  - 1 
7.1.1.1 Medical Support Military Pay                      |S IS              -         f; 1 
7.1.1.2 Medical Support Civilian Pay                       |$ |S              -         |. ! 
7.1.1.3 Medical Support Non pay/Material               j S 1.109,156 |S    604,444          (I 
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7.1.2 Specialty Training $    237,134 S    284,561 
7.1.2.1 Pilot Training S    237,134 S    284,561 1                                                               ! 
7.2 Installation Support S 3,610.570 S 1,938,393 1                         ! 
7.2.1 Base Operating Support Personnel S 1,440,070 S    757,641 -!                                       j 
7.2.1.1 BOS Military Personnel S 1,068,126 S    571,669 \                            \ 
7.2.1.2 BOS Civilian Personnel S    371.944 S     185,972 1 
7.2.3 Installation Support Non-Pay Personnel S 2,170,500 S 1,180,752 
F16 (1980) F16(1990)             j 
CORE Squadron Total (S/YR) S25,003,166 S18330.962 |S43,334,128 
F16 (1980) F16 (1990) 
S Per Flight Hour S      13,891 S     8,487           1 1S        11,189 
I 
S/FH Breakouts: F16 (1980) F16 (1990) 
Fuel (S/FH) S      •   744 S           744 
Personnel -*- Indirect (S/FH) S        4,975 
Maintenance (S/FH) S        2,768 S        2,768 
S Per Flight Hour S      13,891 S        8,487          IS        11,189 
F16(I980) FI6(1990) 1 
CORE Squadron Total (S/YR) 818,330,962         (543,334,128 
11 
S/FH Breakdown FI6 (1980) F16(1990)             1 
Fuel S           744 S           744         I 
Personnel S        7.625 S        3,666         1 
Indirect Support Pers S        2.754 S .      1,309         1 
Maintenance S        2.408 S        2,408         1 
Sustain Support S          360 S3601 
Total S      13^91 S        8,487         | Sll,189 
tl 
Fuel and Maintenance Cost Per Flight Hour F16 (1990)             j 
Fuel                                                            (S           744 S           744         | i 
Maintenance                                             j$       2,408 S        2,408          ! | 
Sustain Support                                         j$          360 S           360 j 
Total                                                       '   |S        3,512 S        3,512 1 
i j 
Type Aircraft                                              |F16(1980) F16 (1990) 
Fuel                                                            |$            1.3 S1.6S 1 
Maintenance                                               j$           4.3 S5.2| 1 — — 
Sustaining Support                                      IS            0.6 S0.8| 
Personnel                                                 j$          13.7 S7.9 r 
Indirect Support Personnel S2.8» 
Squadron Total (S/YR) (SM) S18-3* \ 
Remaining FH of Service 72240    .     r I 
Remaining Years of Service 33 \ j 
Squadron Total ($M)                                  |S      575.07          jS      604.92 i i 
BAAF Total (SM) for Remaining Life of F16 Fleet                                                f ! 
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